Three Opinions Concerning Predestination

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This tract is from The Works of James Arminius, Volume 1, pages 92-100, reprinted by Baker Books, 1999. I have included it in its entirety, except that I have modernized the punctuation and "Americanized" certain spellings (e.g., "Saviour" to "Savior") where applicable. Biographical information on Peter Baro (or Barrowe) follows the article.

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Summary of Three Opinions
Concerning Predestination
by Peter Baro, Professor of Divinity
University of Cambridge, circa 1596



In the Protestant church, three principal opinions exist respecting the eternal predestination of men. In this enumeration we omit the opinions of Pelagius and of others on this subject, which have been condemned by the church.

The first of these opinions, which has in our days obtained great celebrity, and which has on the other hand been as greatly impugned, is the opinion of Calvin and Beza, and as these two good men wish it to appear, it was also the more mature opinion of Luther and St. Augustine. It is to this effect: "God decreed from all eternity to create mankind for this express purpose -- to choose or elect certain men (suppose Peter, John, James, etc.) and to reject or reprobate all the remainder, to illustrate and display his mercy in the former, his justice in the latter, and his glory in both of them. In making this decree of election and reprobation, he had no regard whatever either to Christ the Mediator or to faith in relation to the former, and no regard to any kind of sin either original or actual in relation to the latter; but he decreed absolutely to elect the former and to reprobate the latter, without respect to anything out of himself, but solely because thus it pleased him to display his own glory. But to carry this decree of his into effect, he decreed in the second place, (though this was also from all eternity) that the first man should fall before he begat anyone, that by his sin the whole of the human race might be corrupted and rendered obnoxious to condemnation. That by these means he might show mercy to those whom he had formerly purposed to elect, and for whose sakes likewise he had resolved to send Christ in whom he might adopt them for sons to himself and might finally save them. But that, by the same means, he might not only show mercy to the others whom he had by the same decree determined to reprobate, but that, deserted as they were in that mass of perdition and destitute of Christ the Deliverer and of every aid to salvation, he might at last also miserably destroy them on account of their sins, although those sins had been committed through his own inevitable decree." For they wish to represent this decree as the energetic and efficient principle of all things, being that by which God resolved that all affairs and actions should certainly and necessarily be done and take place, as well as their circumstances, place, time, means, whether they be of a good description by which the elect are saved, or of a bad kind by which the reprobate perish. For he who willeth the end, willeth also the means so that it is utterly impossible for those who are of the former number to do otherwise than believe, lead a pious life and be saved; nor, on the other hand, is it possible for the rest to believe, lead a life of piety, or to be saved. Yet if this be laid down as a position, it is scarcely (and not even scarcely) possible to understand how God may not be accounted the Author of that which is evil as well as of that which is good, and of men's destruction as well as of their salvation.

The second opinion on predestination is that which St. Augustine, and Sohnius, Professor of Divinity in the University of Heidelbergh, held in the latter part of their lives. It is likewise the sentiment of Zanchius and of certain other Protestants, as well as of Cardinal Bellarmine; all of whom unite in disapproving of the first opinion, and agree together in representing this as a predestination to be computed only from the fall of Adam. St. Augustine bears his testimony in favor of it when he thus writes: "From the condemned origin or stock of Adam, as from a single mass delivered to merited damnation, of some God made vessels of wrath to dishonor, and of others vessels of mercy to honor, rendering to the former in punishment that which was their due, and to the latter in grace what was their due." This kind of predestination is thus defined by Sohnius: "The predestination of men is an eternal and immutable decree of God, by which, according to his own good pleasure, he has fore-ordained to eternal life or eternal death the whole of the human race foreknown by him, and considered in the state and circumstances in which they would be after the creation and the fall -- that is, as corrupt and called to Christ by the gospel, for an eternal declaration and expression of his transcendent mercy and justice, and therefore of his glory." Bellarmine wishes it to be understood that the following statement is from the doctrine of St. Augustine: "Predestination is the providence of God by which certain men, who have been mercifully selected from the mass of perdition, are directed by infallible means to life eternal." (1) But this second opinion agrees in one point with the first -- both of them desire to exhibit God as having "decreed from all eternity to elect a certain number of certain men and to reprobate the rest, for a declaration of his mercy in the former, and in the latter of his justice." (2) They also concur in another particular -- for the sake of the former, the Father sent Christ in whom he might adopt them as sons to himself, and might save them; but, by the counsel of God himself and according to the mind of Christ, his benefits had no more reference to the redemption of the rest than to the redemption of brute creatures or of stones, because they did not belong to that certain number, although he daily invites all to repentance, and, as Bellarmine expresses himself, "he offers grace to each of them, and to some of them even in his word and sacraments, to all of them indeed he makes an offer of sufficient grace but not of efficacious." (3) The last point of their agreement is -- that, according to both of them, those certain individuals can by no means avoid believing or fail of being saved, while the rest are not able to believe or to be saved in him. And by this means, not only are the ends of both certain and defined, but the means also by which those ends are attained. From these premises it is manifest that both these opinions impose on men an inevitable necessity -- on the one description of men the necessity of being saved; on the other, the necessity of perishing. Numberless absurdities arise from these sentiments.

But there are likewise some points of difference between them. (1) The first opinion states that men are created and formed by God out of an entire or pure mass, purposely for these very ends. But the second states that out of a corrupt mass some of them are mercifully elected by God, but that the rest are justly deserted and rejected in the same corrupt mass. St. Paul says, "Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?" (Romans 9:21) Now according to Calvin and Beza, this passage is to be understood of the creation of men; but, according to Sohnius and Bellarmine, we must understand it partly of the retrieving and recovery of the human race after the fall, and partly of their perdition. (2) They also differ in this respect: the first of these two opinions is desirous of having no other cause assigned for election and reprobation than the will of God alone, by which he has been pleased to illustrate and display his mercy and justice in electing the former and in reprobating the latter -- that Christ may not be the cause of election but of salvation, he being subordinate to the execution of that decree of God. But it is a definition of the patrons of the second opinion that the cause of election, at least in its material cause, must be sought in Christ the Savior, and that of reprobation in sin; predestination therefore has, according to their scheme, its commencement from the fall, in order to avoid the inconveniences of the preceding opinion. In this view they would display more equity than their predecessors, if they could in reality perform what in words they promise. But if they be much pressed, they must of necessity have recourse to that absolute will which it is their study to avoid. For since all men are equally included in the mass of perdition, and all are on that account sinners, why does God desert in that mass some of them rather than others? Sin cannot possibly be the cause of this difference, because it is no less in those who are delivered than in those who are deserted. They are forced therefore to confess that this difference depends on the absolute will of God, whose pleasure it is to apply the merits of Christ to the elect but not to the reprobate. From these premises it is evident, even according to this milder opinion, that God had determined within himself thus to act before the fall of man, and that he had created the reprobates for one purpose and the elect for another. So that this opinion, though it seems desirous of having predestination to take its commencement only from the fall, comes back in substance to the first which it is desirous to avoid. Thus far then may these two opinions be accounted one.

But the third opinion is that of the Fathers who flourished prior to the age of St. Augustine. It is also the opinion of St. Augustine himself before his contest with Pelagius, at which period he changed some of the sentiments which were entertained by the Ancients, as is apparent from his Retractations and others of his works. These changes excited very great clamors in the church which, although he afterwards endeavored to allay, this on predestination always became from that period a subject of litigation. Those in the Reformed or Protestant church who have espoused this third opinion and defend it are: Philip Melancthon in Germany, Nicholas Hemmingius in Denmark, Gellius Snecanus in Friezland, and not a few of other Divines in various countries. Its tenor is this: "Since God, who is in his nature good, created man for what is good -- that is, for a life of blessedness -- and after his fall promised his Son to him as a Deliverer by whom he might bruise the serpent's head, and therefore imposed this law according to which he will form a final judgment concerning every man, 'Whosoever believeth in Christ, shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned;' he likewise every day truly calls and invites all men, without any definition, to repentance, faith and salvation." Since these are its terms, it is manifest that Christ is the stone of probation, by which the elect may be discerned from the reprobates, and that no other secret decree of God respecting the salvation and destruction of men has been revealed and made known to us in the written word of God than this, "Whosoever believeth shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned." Wherefore God has predestinated such as he from all eternity foreknew would believe on Christ (who is the only way to life eternal) that they might be made conformable to him in glory. But he hath likewise from all eternity reprobated all rebels, and such as contumaciously continue in sin, as persons unfit for his kingdom.

That this is the opinion of the ancient Fathers of the church is attested both by their writings and by those likewise who have declined from them in this matter. This is confirmed by Beza who, when writing on the second verse of the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans ("God hath not cast away his people whom he foreknew") produces this remark, "Nor are we on any account to listen to the Fathers, who refer this to faith foreseen." Beza therefore entertains no doubt respecting its being the opinion of the Fathers, but he thinks his own opinion is to be preferred to it. But his opinion is denied by others who, choosing in preference to adhere to the Fathers, believe that God determined to create the first man and all his posterity for a participation of eternal felicity; that he was prepared to bestow upon every one of them all the aids both of nature and grace that were necessary for obtaining that blessedness, and to remove out of the way those hindrances which might prevent them from obtaining it; and that he has not willed concerning any man to exclude him from the society of the blessed or to be consigned to eternal torments without previously having taken his sins into consideration.

The third opinion agrees with the two preceding in this circumstance -- that it holds the election and reprobation of men by God to be eternal and determinate. It has this also in common with the second alone -- that since God chose us in Christ before the foundation of the world and separated us from reprobates and unbelievers, it holds Christ to be the cause of election, as we have already observed, and sin the cause of reprobation -- both which tenets are denied by the first of these opinions. But these are the only points of agreement of the three severally between each other. For the third differs egregiously and in many points from the two others which declare "that God had purposely and absolutely decreed from eternity to create the greatest part of mankind for destruction (according to the first opinion) or to leave them in the fall of Adam without any hope of pardon (according to the second) and therefore that Christ hath profited these miserable beings nothing to salvation, according to the decree of God himself and the personal will of Christ. But that Christ has been sent by his Father or has suffered death, not so much for them as for brutes, stones, or even devils themselves (yet to the latter of these, it is obvious the benefits of the death of Christ can on no account be extended) and that it is not therefore possible for these miserable reprobates ever to believe and be saved." The third of these opinions disapproves of both these dogmas, and the theology which it inculcates constantly holds the two following axioms as the greatest verities and depending on the plain and manifest word of God: (1) it is the will of God that all men be saved and that none perish, and (2) Christ has died for all. God therefore never has hated or purposed to hate anyone in reference to his being a man formed by him, but only in reference to his being a sinner. On the contrary, he has promised and sent Christ to all those who have fallen in Adam and are sinners, that he may bruise the head of the serpent and restore that which had perished. It has also been his will that the Gospel should be published to every creature -- that is, to each of the human race -- that all and every one of them may come to the knowledge of the truth and be saved. This is called by the ancient Fathers, "the antecedent will of God." It is therefore of God and of his mere grace that certain individuals are saved, and it is through their own perverseness and depravity that others are damned. This is called the "consequent will of God" because it is a consequence of the impenitency of men who persevere in sin. For they are damned because they would not receive the love of the truth that they might be saved," as the Apostle expresses it (2 Thess. 2:10) or, in the words of Christ, because they loved darkness rather than light" (John 3:19) -- that is, because they would not obey Christ when he called them and wished to gather them under his wings, and because, in St. Stephen's language, "they always resisted the Holy Ghost." (Acts 7:51) So that this declaration by the Prophet has become a standing truth, "O Israel, thou has destroyed thyself! But in Me is thy help!" (Hosea 13:9)

Such are the points in which these three opinions agree and disagree among themselves, so that the first and second include within them and impose upon men the necessity both of damnation and salvation. The third opinion has not that tendency. For though it allows predestination to be immutable in the Divine Mind, yet it denies that such predestination renders the wills of men immutable and imposes necessity on them, lest by such conclusions it should cause God to appear as the Author of sin and of man's destruction. From these statements it is evident that the whole of this controversy respecting predestination turns upon this hinge, "Is Beza's opinion, to which we have assigned the first place, and into which the second merges, to be preferred to this last which was patronized by the Christian Fathers?" Beza declares that "this is a point on which these Fathers can on no account be heard." This assertion is denied by those who espouse the third opinion. We consider it lawful for us to enquire into the truth, and especially when it relates to an important matter, in which the eternal felicity and the eternal misery of mankind are concerned. Nay, we contend that it is not only lawful but that we ought with the greatest diligence to institute and continue such a necessary enquiry, and that we must not recede from the opinions of the Fathers until we have some determinate and plain reason for such a departure. But since all these three opinions are entertained in different parts of the Protestant church, of which it is not possible for more than one to be true, let everyone consider and seriously reflect which of the three he ought to reject and which he ought to embrace. And let no man addict himself to the author of one of these opinions or of that which is contrary to it, or adopt the sentiments of either without a previous diligent exercise of his judgment, if it be his wish to have a proper regard to his own salvation.

I repeat it therefore, that two of these opinions rest on the foundation "that God, by an immutable and irrevocable decree, has, without any reference to sin, but by his own absolute will which no man is able to resist, determined within himself from all eternity to reprobate by far the largest portion of the human race and (according to the first opinion) to create them for eternal destruction or (according to the second) to desert them from the time when Adam sinned. That some of those who are of the number of the reprobate are every day necessarily and inevitably coming into existence and perishing, they being persons to whom God has never vouchsafed his grace, or if in his word or sacraments, he makes an offer of it to some of them as to those who have some connection with the Church of God, such an offer is not made by him with seriousness as though they should be saved by that grace. But on the contrary, it is made that they may be rendered less excusable and may at last be more grievously punished. That the advent and the death of Christ have not been undertaken on their account, and that the benefits of his death have no more reference to men of this description than to stones, brutes, or even devils themselves, because they have been from all eternity reprobated by God and purposely created or (which bears the same import) have been left in a lost mass that they might be consigned to eternal destruction." This is the foundation on which the first and second rest, but which is rejected by the third as a falsehood and contrary both to the sacred Scriptures and to the goodness of God. The two others object against the third, but very undeservedly, that it is Pelagianism. For among the Pelagians neither were those Fathers numbered who flourished before the time of Pelagius, nor were St. Jerome and St. Augustine prior to their contest with the Pelagians; and yet all of them openly professed this third sentiment. Nor are those Reformed churches that embrace it in the present age in the least inclined to Pelagianism -- for instance, the churches in the greater part of Germany, and in the whole of Denmark and Norway. Philip Melancthon, who composed the Augustan Confession, of which the other Protestant churches have expressed their approbation, was not a Pelagian, nor yet are different good and learned men in various countries Pelagians because they think the third opinion which has been adduced on this subject is preferable to the two others. Banish then such an illiberal calumny as this -- which has been invented for the purpose of overpowering truth -- nor let it operate as a hindrance on anyone in diligently and repeatedly prosecuting an inquiry into the truth of this question.


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Peter Baro was born in France. He was admitted to the ministry by John Calvin, but later fled to England to escape persecution by the Catholics. There he was elected to the Lady Margaret's Professor of Divinity chair at Cambridge. Eventually, his opposition to Calvinism earned him several powerful enemies who misrepresented him before Queen Elizabeth I. He had to resign his position at Cambridge, and he retired to London where he lived for 3 or 4 more years. Baro's work is of importance because it preceded the published sentiments of Jacobus (James) Arminius.

[Guest]

Well I like to post long things supporting my beliefs also but I think steve as moderator has asked us not to do this..I think its only fair for you to comply as I have..if you have any questions maybe you could send him a message.It makes sense what hes asked since it keeps the fruit of our communication based on our exchanges rather than large blocks of others oppinions.


Lord Bless you


Steve