Of course not. I would never suggest such. "Philosophy" is simply thinking. "Philosophy of mathematics" is tantamount to "thinking about mathematics".First, the idea that theological and philosophical reasoning is somehow opposed to Scripture is a false idea.
It's a common devise to claim metaphorical usage to any passages with which one disagrees. God changing his mind is not at all in the same category as the metaphors to which you refer.Those statements—to state it once again—which refer to God as changing His mind are to be understood metaphorically, in the same way one understands the Scriptures when they speak of God sleeping, or forgetting things, or being a rock.
Yes, it's these Greek philosophers who brought their ideas about God into Christendom, such as God being impassible, extratemporal, immutable all of which in my thinking is false. Man was created in God's image. We are much more like God than is commonly thought. We have free will like God. We have emotions as God does. We live within time as God does, and we are influenced by others and act accordingly as God is. For example, when the Israelites wanted a king like the other nations, God gave them a king, but He lamented the fact: "You would not have me to rule over you," He said. He gave them a king at their insistence, though He knew it would have negative ramifications.We mustn’t check our reason at the door when we read the Scriptures; and far from being contradictory to reason, the notion that God is eternal is able to be, and has been, discovered by reason, as, for example, the ancient Greek philosophers demonstrated (and, so, the claim that these are contradictory to reason is either a rash judgment, or, at least, one that stems from a lack of understanding of what is being stated).
Your logic seems impeccable, but I think there is a flaw in it. The agent (God) can see that person P will freely choose to perform "some act" at time T because at time T person P has no desire to do anything but "some act", as God can foresee, so person P freely does it. I fail to see how God's foreknowledge nulls free will.How can these actions be seen, when they haven't yet been done? And if it WERE possible for agent A to see some act C prior to person P doing it at time T, tell me how P could refrain from doing it at time T? If He could refrain, the A didn't see it after all.
What you state here is borderline unintelligible. First you state that the Son and Father are not the same person, that there are persons in the Trinity, then you deny there are "parts" in the Trinity. But one synonym for the word "parts" is the word "members". It seems to me not unusual to speak of the members of the Trinity, so how can you say they are not parts? Perhaps you have an understandable explanation of what you, or rather your church authorities, might mean in this case.That first sentence is only true if by “hypostasis” is meant “nature” or “substance” (for the Son of God has always shared the same substance as the Father); but, at least in Christian theological tradition, “hypostasis” has come to mean “Person”, and the Son is not the same Person as the Father.
Once again, there are no “parts” to the Trinity; there are Persons in the Trinity, but not “parts”. To think of the Trinity as having “parts” is to fundamentally (and fatally) misunderstand the doctrine of the Trinity.
The basic argument that if what a person will choose is unchangeable, therefore that choice is not free, fails. It implies freedom necessarily must include uncertainty, and that's a false presupposition. The question is the origin of the action, not the uncertainty of it. Freedom does not mean uncertainty, freedom means the origin of the action is in the creature's power of choice rather than something fatalistically determined from the outside.Homer wrote:Your logic seems impeccable, but I think there is a flaw in it.
If by "unchangeable" you mean "settled", then I agree that that is the basic argument. But I am curious how it fails. You then say:Dizerner wrote:The basic argument that if what a person will choose is unchangeable, therefore that choice is not free, fails.
Again, I am supposing that "uncertainty" means "not settled". And what is false about the stance that a free act must be unsettled prior to the act?It implies freedom necessarily must include uncertainty, and that's a false presupposition.
God's offspring is truly divine, then there are two beings who are truly divine, resulting in two gods.
