The deficiency of the assumption that Jesus allows divorce

[Homer]

AVoice,

You wrote:

I invite you to introduce arguments that actually do relate to the discussion. I am happy to answer any questions you have on this.

I have a couple questions for you:

1. I think it must be admitted Jesus is addressing the application of the Law of Moses and establishing His law, which goes back to God's original intention. I believe He allowed divorce for immorality between actual married people. You say the provision for divorce applies only to those who are betrothed. Surely you must believe that Jesus' command regarding divorce applies today. Do you say that no engaged couple today may end their engagement for any reason other than fornication?

2. Do you realize that sexual relations were allowed among the betrothed Jews after the time of Antiochus Epiphanes?* Wouldn't the couple in this case be "one flesh"? There could be one class of betrothed who were "one flesh" and another class where the girl was still a virgin. How would Jesus' exception clause apply in these cases if your understanding is correct?

*Quote from article on marriage in Zondervan Encyclopedia of the bible:

During and after the persecutions of Antiochus Epiphanes, however, the requirement of chastity was relaxed and the betrothed girl was permitted sexual relations with her future husband.

[AVoice]

AVoice,

You wrote:

I invite you to introduce arguments that actually do relate to the discussion. I am happy to answer any questions you have on this.

I have a couple questions for you:

1. I think it must be admitted Jesus is addressing the application of the Law of Moses and establishing His law, which goes back to God's original intention. I believe He allowed divorce for immorality between actual married people. You say the provision for divorce applies only to those who are betrothed. Surely you must believe that Jesus' command regarding divorce applies today. Do you say that no engaged couple today may end their engagement for any reason other than fornication?

2. Do you realize that sexual relations were allowed among the betrothed Jews after the time of Antiochus Epiphanes?* Wouldn't the couple in this case be "one flesh"? There could be one class of betrothed who were "one flesh" and another class where the girl was still a virgin. How would Jesus' exception clause apply in these cases if your understanding is correct?

*Quote from article on marriage in Zondervan Encyclopedia of the bible:

During and after the persecutions of Antiochus Epiphanes, however, the requirement of chastity was relaxed and the betrothed girl was permitted sexual relations with her future husband.

Thanks for the questions.

From what I understand, Mattrose actually gets what I am saying. He doesn't agree, but I think he still gets how 5:32 and 19:9 can reasonably be read in the manner which I am showing. I prepared an answer to Homer's questions but then thought how interesting it would be to see if Mattrose were able to demonstrate to this extent how well he gets it.
Matt, I give you the first shot if you care to take it.

[AVoice]

When fornication is interpreted to mean adultery

Two problems here

First, you should probably say "when PORNEIA is interpreted to mean adultery" since the definition of PORNEIA is exactly what we are arguing. By using the KJV's "fornication" with the meaning we both gave to it in this thread (pre-marital sex), you are using your conclusion as part of your argument!

Second, I don't think anybody here is interpreting PORNEIA as 'adultery' alone. The term refers to sexual sin. It is a broad term. It can apply to fornication, incest, adultery, etc. Your first sentence should read: "When Porneia is interpreted to mean sexual sin". This is the 'model' you are arguing against, so you should state it in a way that well-represents that position in the interest of honest dialogue.

You are not interpreting porneia to mean 'sexual sin". You are very clearly defining it in this context to mean "post marital sexual sin". That is where only part of the much larger argument against the divorce for adultery model is found.
It appears plain to me that you are using that conclusion of what porneia means in this context as part of your argument instead of objectively allowing both conclusions to run their course of scrutiny and evaluation.

The model I am arguing against is not at all well described, as you say, what you think I should have said.
I am arguing against porneia (fornication) being interpreted as POST Marital Sexual Sin in the particular context it is found.
PRE Marital Sexual Sin, as the definition of fornication in that context, is well accommodated for, by their culture and the reality of the premarital divorce for fornication, which was not for the post marital offense (adultery). It is also well accommodated for by the fact that grammatical examples of exception clauses inserted withing similar formats can serve as non essential parts of their sentences.
Seems like you are suggesting that there is no difference between the premarital and post marital sexual sin. There are two distinct words, one appointed to each separate sin, obviously there is a difference. Five places in the NT, fornication and adultery are listed side by side, not including 5:32 and 19:9 where they are also together. Obviously there is a difference between the two words.
Honest and concise dialogue, if you refuse to use the word fornication to apply to the premarital sexual sin, is to distinguish as follows:
Post marital sexual sin
Pre marital sexual sin
Post marital sexual sin violates a marriage. Adultery is appropriate to describe sexual sin that violates a marriage.
Do you not agree that while all adultery can be called fornication, not all fornication is necessarily adultery? The particular context where it is found, is what determines what fornication (porneia) means.

[mattrose]

AVoice,

I have a couple questions for you:

1. I think it must be admitted Jesus is addressing the application of the Law of Moses and establishing His law, which goes back to God's original intention. I believe He allowed divorce for immorality between actual married people. You say the provision for divorce applies only to those who are betrothed. Surely you must believe that Jesus' command regarding divorce applies today. Do you say that no engaged couple today may end their engagement for any reason other than fornication?

2. Do you realize that sexual relations were allowed among the betrothed Jews after the time of Antiochus Epiphanes?* Wouldn't the couple in this case be "one flesh"? There could be one class of betrothed who were "one flesh" and another class where the girl was still a virgin. How would Jesus' exception clause apply in these cases if your understanding is correct?

AVoice seemingly is interested in me answering these 2 questions AS IF I were defending his position that 'divorce' is only allowed during the betrothal period when fornication (pre-marital sex) has occured. I think that if I were AVoice, I would answer #1 by saying that their is not a direct correlation b/w ancient Jewish betrothal and contemporary American engagement, but I would add that their system is better and that engagements shouldn't be as fickle as they sometimes are today. As for #2, if I were AVoice I would say that non-revalatory changes in application (like the changes made during the time of Antiochus Ephiphanes, are in-admissable. The wedding night ought to have been when they became 'one flesh'. In any case, the exception clause was a means to get out of the betrothal before sexual union had taken place (whenever that occurs).

While these are good questions, I don't think they are the strongest argument against Avoice's position. The strongest argument against Avoice's position is that he is needlessly over-particularizing the greek word porneia, creating a straw man argument against the more typical interpretation, and over-utilzing a questionable textual tradition.

[mattrose]

You are not interpreting porneia to mean 'sexual sin". You are very clearly defining it in this context to mean "post marital sexual sin". That is where only part of the much larger argument against the divorce for adultery model is found. It appears plain to me that you are using that conclusion of what porneia means in this context as part of your argument instead of objectively allowing both conclusions to run their course of scrutiny and evaluation.

In healthy debate, you must trust that your oppenent knows his own position. You declare that I am not interpreting porneia to mean sexual sin. You are wrong. I believe that the exception clause provides a legitimate means to divorce if the following sexual sins are found to be present: fornication during the betrothal period, if the marriage is determined to be incest, or adultery after the marriage ceremony. Obviously the latter (adultery) would have been the most common form of porneia and so it is the one most directly addressed. Your position particularizes porneia for this passage. My positon keeps its meaning broad. You are claiming that I am particularizing it as much as you, but in a different way (adultery instead of fornication). You are incorrect.

[mattrose]

The model I am arguing against is not at all well described, as you say, what you think I should have said.
.....

Honest and concise dialogue, if you refuse to use the word fornication to apply to the premarital sexual sin, is to distinguish as follows:
Post marital sexual sin
Pre marital sexual sin
Post marital sexual sin violates a marriage. Adultery is appropriate to describe sexual sin that violates a marriage.
Do you not agree that while all adultery can be called fornication, not all fornication is necessarily adultery? The particular context where it is found, is what determines what fornication (porneia) means.

Once again your post is very poorly worded and goes over material we have already covered. I think we have already agreed to the definitions for our debate.

1. Fornication is an english word that we both agree is best defined as pre-marital sexual sin
2. Adultery is an english word that we both agree is best defined as post-marital sexual sin
3. Porneia is a greek word that we both agree broadly covers all sexual sin (fornication, adultery, etc), but can be used in more specific ways depending on context

Your argument is that porneia, as dictated by the context of the passages in question, can refer only to fornication.
My argument is that porneia, as dictated by the context of the entire Bible, most likely refers generally to sexual sin.

[Homer]

AVoice,

Your argument is based on an assumption that a concise statement by Jesus about divorce contains all He intended teach. As I understand your position (not always easy), you believe that if there was an exception to His statement elsewhere then He would contradict Himself. Let's look at a brief example so we do not get sidetracked into other issues, such as whether a woman could divorce her husband, etc. Consider Mark 10:11:

Mark 10:11
He answered, “Anyone who divorces his wife and marries another woman commits adultery against her.

Jesus here states a rule with no exception mentioned. But could there have been an exception that was taken for granted by His audience? What would be in their minds, considering they lived in a culture where the law codes everywhere allowed a woman to be executed for adultery?

I have tried to point out to you that in order to understand the scriptures we must take into consideration the whole counsel of the word. Take the Sabbath law for example:

Exodus 20:8-10

8. “Remember the Sabbath day by keeping it holy. 9. Six days you shall labor and do all your work, 10. but the seventh day is a sabbath to the LORD your God. On it you shall not do any work, neither you, nor your son or daughter, nor your male or female servant, nor your animals, nor any foreigner residing in your towns.

Would you say this is a plain statement allowing no exceptions if taken in isolation? But we know the priests were commanded to work on the Sabbath. And did not Jesus inform us that rescuing an animal from a pit was allowed? He said it was lawful.

And consider another example where other stipulations are understood:

Exodus 22:1
1. “If a man steals an ox or a sheep, and slaughters it or sells it, he shall restore five oxen for an ox and four sheep for a sheep.

Could the man steal a goat or a donkey and not make restitution? Could a woman steal the ox or sheep? Of course not; that is understood though unstated.

Keep in mind that Jesus' response to the Pharisees was given when they were trying to trap Him. They were not interested in whether divorce was allowed for adultery; both sides of the divorce issue (Hillel & Shammai) agreed that it was allowed.

[mattrose]

AVoice,

Your argument is based on an assumption that a concise statement by Jesus about divorce contains all He intended teach.

This is a very solid critique of Avoice's position.

I believe we could make a strong case for certain exceptions even if there were no 'exception clauses' in the passages we're discussing. Avoice, likely, would find this statement somewhat repulsive b/c he interprets Jesus' statement as an absolute statement rather than as a bold principle.

[AVoice]

You are not interpreting porneia to mean 'sexual sin". You are very clearly defining it in this context to mean "post marital sexual sin". That is where only part of the much larger argument against the divorce for adultery model is found. It appears plain to me that you are using that conclusion of what porneia means in this context as part of your argument instead of objectively allowing both conclusions to run their course of scrutiny and evaluation.

In healthy debate, you must trust that your oppenent knows his own position. You declare that I am not interpreting porneia to mean sexual sin. You are wrong. I believe that the exception clause provides a legitimate means to divorce if the following sexual sins are found to be present: fornication during the betrothal period, if the marriage is determined to be incest, or adultery after the marriage ceremony. Obviously the latter (adultery) would have been the most common form of porneia and so it is the one most directly addressed. Your position particularizes porneia for this passage. My positon keeps its meaning broad. You are claiming that I am particularizing it as much as you, but in a different way (adultery instead of fornication). You are incorrect.

Thank you for clarifying your position. I did not get it, that you are taking the exception clause to also INCLUDE the premarital divorce for fornication. While you certainly apply it to the post marital divorce for her sexual sin, which is correctly identified as adultery, you suppose that your view can also include at the same time the premarital divorce for fornication!

Let me say this before I continue.
The various takes on HOW the verses in 5:32 and 19:9 can be read should be allowed to undergo the scrutiny the contexts present. Each of us should respect the questions the other asks. The questions we ask of each other will test whether or not the contexts can support that 'take'.
First of all, we each need to acknowledge that we understand how the other is reading it under their model. Given the words used in the text, can we accept that the opposing side has a reasonable way of reading it in that way?
Once we put ourselves in each other's shoes, we should then ask questions of each other allowing the actual texts to prove our particular 'take'.

Now that I understand that you are including the premarital sexual sin alongside adultery as what the exception clause covers, the question that you did not answer for me, which Homer asked, becomes especially applicable to your position:

Do you say that no engaged couple today may end their engagement for any reason other than fornication?

Honest reason must admit that it is possible to reasonably read the exception clause as a complete aside (given the dual usage of the words husband wife and divorce and the normal definition of fornication and the fact that they practiced a premarital divorce for fornication, not adultery). Under this model, that non essential 'aside' is exempt from Homer's question. This is because such asides, that are completely non essential, by their very nature, are inserted possessing their own unique connotation and application. Such connotation and application, by virtue of the fact that it is a non essential, are separate from the points the sentence is making, which sentences can totally ignore that "non essential".
In short, by including the premarital divorce along with adultery as what the exception clause pertains to, you have made the premarital divorce just as essential as the post marital divorce, and hence answerable to the above question Homer has presented. I await your answer.

[AVoice]

AVoice,

Your argument is based on an assumption that a concise statement by Jesus about divorce contains all He intended teach.

This is a very solid critique of Avoice's position.

I believe we could make a strong case for certain exceptions even if there were no 'exception clauses' in the passages we're discussing. Avoice, likely, would find this statement somewhat repulsive b/c he interprets Jesus' statement as an absolute statement rather than as a bold principle.

Sure, statements can be found where reasonable exceptions can be thought of. But each of these scriptural situations are in their particular contexts. Questions could be asked and answers to those questions can be compared to the actual texts to see if the supposed reasonable exceptions are valid.
Since other places can be found where undeniably reasonable exceptions can be thought of, which exceptions do not conflict with the particular text, does this automatically translate that all contexts must therefore have exceptions? Should not the particular contexts be individually tested to see if the statement made is absolute or not?
To make such a statement of the existence of reasonable exceptions in certain cases and extrapolate that to suggest that no absolute statements are possible within the scriptures would be an over generalisation. That is not sound doctrine.
That is why discussion of this particular topic, if dealt with honestly and diligently, will respectfully welcome and answer the questions their opposing sides present.
No Mattrose, the critique was not very solid at all.