My impressions of the debate in progress

[Guest]

Mr. Gregg continues to dwell at his keyboard this evening. He writes

Dr. White, at the end of the third debate Monday, in the process of trying to bolster his assertion that Acts 13:48 teaches Calvinism, made two significant errors (which I had considered calling him on, but I didn’t want to be nit-picky). First, he misquoted the line from Acts 13:48 as “as many as were appointed to faith” (instead of “appointed to eternal life”), and second, he misquoted Philippians 1:29, reading the word “appointed” in place of “granted.” Talk about eisegesis!

Now I felt it would be uncharitable to jump on these mistakes, because I did not wish to embarrass him. If it were coming from a person of less familiarity with the material, I would think nothing of the mistake. But Dr. White has no doubt quoted these verses more often than he can count, which makes the error seem somewhat more inexcusable.

I have not taken the time to go back and listen to the recordings. Why should I? Steve Gregg hasn’t even bothered to take the time to seriously interact with the hours of response I offered to his own recordings last year! Of course, in those instances, I played extensive amounts of his own words and then interacted with them, but that is hardly relevant now, is it? It is not like I have written entire books on this topic where I have addressed Acts 13:48 and Philippians 1:29 and have done so without misquoting them (or promoting false translations of them). But why should anyone worry about published works? Irrelevant! Point out when someone paraphrases a verse while they are rushing to finish comments within a short time frame on a radio program! That’s far more relevant to the issues than any published commentary ever could be, right? He goes on,

The word “granted,” in Phil.1:29, is not the same word as tasso (”appointed” in Acts 13:48 ). It is the word charizomai, which is well translated as “grant.” It is to show a favor or kindness.

Of course, I never said they were the same terms, and anyone reading The Potter’s Freedom would see that I gave the proper terms. But something else I pointed out in TPF was this:

Here Paul speaks of two things that have been granted to Christians. The term granted is the Greek term ἐχαρίσθη from the term charizomai, “to give as a gift.” And what has been “granted” to believers? The eye seems drawn to the final phrase, “to suffer for His sake.” This is what seems to take up the mind when reading the passage. It has been granted as a gift to suffer for Christ! What a strange thought for many today who have not experienced persecution and suffering, but it surely was not to those to whom Paul was writing. But just as suffering is not something brought about by our “free will,” neither is the first thing granted to us: to believe in Christ. This is the normal term used for saving faith (πιστεύειν). God has granted to us to believe in Christ. Why would this be if, as we are told, anyone can πιστεύειν, can believe? Mr. Gregg continues,

To the Calvinist, the idea is taken from this verse that faith is simply a gift. This is an important concept to them, because they intend by it that no man can believe unless given a special gift of faith at regeneration. It is an important concept, and, if true, would be good to have stated in unambiguous terms in scripture (not in merely the standard ambiguous text, like Eph.2:8-9).

I am noticing more and more that for Mr. Gregg and his cadre of followers, difficult texts are automatically “ambiguous.” They are very quick to point out what a text doesn’t say, but oh so very slow to give us much direct insight into what it does say. So we end up with the repeated Greggian phraseology, “That might be what it means, but we just don’t know.” We don’t know if God knows the future. We don’t know if God has a decree. We don’t know…a lot of stuff! Maybe this is some more “epistemic humility,” or, it might just be a lot of confusion. It is hard to say. In any case, which part of “to grant as a gift” in Philippians 1:29 is “ambiguous”? Well, there doesn’t seem to be anything in Scripture that cannot become “ambiguous”:

The most serviceable text, outside of Eph.2:8-9 to establish this “faith is a gift” claim is Philippians 1:29. But does the word “grant” carry this much doctrinal baggage? Of course, we can speak of a gift as something “granted”—but we can also speak of the granting of a favor or a privilege. In my opinion, Paul is saying that the Philippians have not only been granted the privilege of believing the gospel, but of enduring the suffering that comes with it. Both, believing and suffering for Christ, are privileges.

Just as the discussion of Paul’s willingness to be accursed in the place of his brethren according to the flesh in Romans 9 can be “ambiguized” into a discussion of the blessings of the lineage (though we never did figure out how Pharaoh fit in there), or the direct objects of finite verbs in Ephesians 1 can be “ambiguized” away, so too the infinitival form of “believe,” along with charizomai, “to give as a gift” can be massaged and run through the Ambiguizer 3000 to come out to something much less than faith as a gift of God: instead, it’s just the privilege of believing, you see. Gregg goes on:

I certainly would agree with that statement, and have never found it to challenge anything I have ever believed. Not all people have had the privilege of hearing the gospel. “Faith comes by hearing,” but hearing is a privilege some have experienced and others have not. God had directly decreed that the Philippians would have this privilege of hearing, because, when Paul and his companions, on their second missionary journey, were casting about for some indication of God’s will for their itinerary, one of them had a dream telling them to go to Macedonia, of which Philippi was the foremost city, and the first city where they ministered (Acts 16:6-12).

It is clear that, had Paul’s team taken one of their other planned routes, the Philippians might not have heard the gospel for another generation. God specifically granted these readers the privilege of becoming believers, by sending the gospel to them.

Please note carefully the methodology here. There is everything true in recognizing that God had granted the Philippians the privilege of believing, but is that what Paul actually stated in the inspired text? And I might add in passing, given Gregg has stated that Paul could have resisted God’s drawing of him, I truly wonder upon what basis Mr. Gregg can even speak of God directly “decreeing” this, unless, as I would have to guess, that decree did not actually mean anything would happen as a result. It is still difficult to know how Mr. Gregg’s theology actually functions. But in any case, as is consistent with his methodology, Mr. Gregg confuses the offering of commentary with exegesis. What does the above have to do with the fact that Paul said it had been granted to them to believe and to suffer? Consider the context again:

Phil. 1:27-28 Only conduct yourselves in a manner worthy of the gospel of Christ, so that whether I come and see you or remain absent, I will hear of you that you are standing firm in one spirit, with one mind striving together for the faith of the gospel; in no way alarmed by [your] opponents– which is a sign of destruction for them, but of salvation for you, and that [too], from God. Now, I can see why God’s sovereignty would be a foundation upon which to call the believers to conduct worthy of the gospel so as to stand firm in the face of their opponents. I can see why a Christian who has been called by God’s sovereign grace to fulfill God’s purpose in his or her life would stand firm in the face of opposition and would see their steadfastness as a sign of their salvation, and of the destruction of God’s enemies. And I can see why Paul would speak of this as coming “from God.” All of this makes perfect sense, and does not require us to for a moment to fiddle with the translation of the text. God granted them faith (”to believe”), and the same God who granted them faith grants to them as a gift that they should suffer for Christ’s sake, just as the apostle. A wonderful text indeed! But I finish with Mr. Gregg’s comments,

There is another aspect to this that Paul may also intend. One of the Philippian Christians, Lyddia, had been of the faithful Jewish remnant, and was among the first converts there. We are specifically told that God opened her heart to heed what Paul preached (Acts 16:14). No doubt other of the faithful Jews and God-fearers in that town had the same experience of God opening their hearts. For those, like Lyddia, who were looking for the Messiah, having Paul come to her town was indeed a great favor from God—in view of how many similar faithful Jews there must have been in many of the towns that Paul never visited.

I only point out that even though Lydia was a God-fearer, God still had to open her heart so that she could respond to the things Paul was saying. And while again, all of this is true, none of it militates for a moment against what I said: saving faith is the gift of God, granted, given, to the elect of God. Without the Spirit of God, there is no saving faith. The point is established.

The full article on his blog can be found here.

[Guest]

But in your second assertion, God's knowledge is limited to knowledge of "would be" and not "will be". It seems that you argue that god "knows" the following:

(a) Saul will come down, if certain conditions AA obtain

(b) Saul will not come down, if certain conditions BB obtain

But do you deny that God foreknows in addition to those,

(c) Conditions BB will obtain

(d) Saul will not come down.

(See bolded text above) No, I do not deny but rather affirm both. As I have stated before, the Calvinist and Open Theist both seem limit what God can know about the future to what God actually controls. I affirm that God can both determine to bring something about and know for certain what will come about. I also affirm that what God knows about the future does not need to be determined by Him in advance for Him to know it. In other words:

-God knew what would happen no matter what David did
-God knew Saul would not come down

So could David had stayed and been captured? If he so desired. In that case God would have already known David would have stayed and been turned over to Saul. Just because God knows what will happen does not mean their aren't aspects of God's knowledge of the future that are not passive. God both actively and passively knows the future, IMO. When God so desires a certain result, He can and does "move on man" to bring things to pass as He desires. If God, on the other hand actively determines all things and this is said to be the cause of all things then God, by logical necessity, causes all things including Adam's fall, sin entering the world, death, all the wicked thoughts and actions of His creation. He would be the direct cause of these events, not us because we would not have a choice. Could God do this anyway if He so desired? Sure, but he wouldn't be able to judge the world if that were the case.

Rom 3:5 But if our unrighteousness demonstrates the righteousness of God, what shall we say? Is God unjust who inflicts wrath? (I speak as a man.) 6 Certainly not! For then how will God judge the world?

If God foreknows (c) and (d) then we are back to square one, and we can reformulate Craig's expression as:

"It is possible that Saul come down, even though God foreknows (c) and (d)."

I judge this to be incoherent.

You judge it to be incoherent because you are trying to assert that what God knows about the future causes the future. I'm saying that what God knows about the future is the actual result of the what will actually happen. In other words, it's as if God pressed "FF" to "see" what will happen. Better yet, since God is the author of creation He's more like the director behind the camera that is able to "FF" through all of future and then change it as He sees fit (being the director). If I play back a home video of my children I realize that no matter how many times I watch, the outcome is the same, yet when I was recording I could have directed my children as I desired to bring about the outcome I desired without removing their "free will".

Now to understand my position you have to hold three thoughts in you mind at the same time.

A-God knows exactly what will happen
B-God interacts with His creation as He sees fit to bring about what He desires
C-God always knew both A and B.

So God is actively working in our lives to conform us into the image of Christ even though He already knows the outcome. If the outcome is known ahead of time, I do not believe this removes free will. Knowing what will happen does not mean there were no choices involved. If it did, God would not need to interact at all with us, He would simply bring about what He desires.
Well, enough rambling.

Later,
Sean

[Guest]

If God foreknows (c) and (d) then we are back to square one, and we can reformulate Craig's expression as:

"It is possible that Saul come down, even though God foreknows (c) and (d)."

I judge this to be incoherent.

You judge it to be incoherent because you are trying to assert that what God knows about the future causes the future.

No. My argument is not based on that and does not require it. It's enough that God knows (d), whatever the cause of (d) is.

I'm saying that what God knows about the future is the actual result of the what will actually happen. In other words, it's as if God pressed "FF" to "see" what will happen. Better yet, since God is the author of creation He's more like the director behind the camera that is able to "FF" through all of future and then change it as He sees fit (being the director).

OK, fine. You're saying that God isn't the *cause* of Saul coming down or not coming down, so Saul is free to come down or not.

But what I'm saying is that Saul chooses one or the other, for whatever reason. Saul doesn't (and cannot, due to the law of noncontradiction) do both.

Somehow, God knows in advance (by pressing "FF") that one will obtain, and the other will not. Because He holds no false beliefs, it cannot be otherwise than as He knows it, namely, "Saul will not come down" is true (and has always been true), and "Saul will come down" is false (and has always been and will always be false).

God cannot know (or have ever known) that "Saul will come down" (as a statement of the actual state of affairs that will obtain, not a simple statement of possibilty) is true.

It seems to me that Craig says that somehow God can know "Saul will come down" (as a statement of the actual state of affairs that will obtain), even if that does not come to pass. Sorry, but that's just a fancy way of saying X can be A and not A at the same time and in the same relationship. At some point T in the past, God somenow can know "Saul will come down" and "Saul will not come down."

Not even God can know that.

If I play back a home video of my children I realize that no matter how many times I watch, the outcome is the same, yet when I was recording I could have directed my children as I desired to bring about the outcome I desired without removing their "free will".

Now to understand my position you have to hold three thoughts in you mind at the same time.

A-God knows exactly what will happen
B-God interacts with His creation as He sees fit to bring about what He desires
C-God always knew both A and B.

So God is actively working in our lives to conform us into the image of Christ even though He already knows the outcome. If the outcome is known ahead of time, I do not believe this removes free will. Knowing what will happen does not mean there were no choices involved. If it did, God would not need to interact at all with us, He would simply bring about what He desires.

Right, knowing what will happen does not mean there were no choices involved. Of course, this is what the Calvinist argument is, so which side are you on again?

You don't see yet that simple foreknowlege (not foreordination) of choices is enough to remove libertarian free will. Well, perhaps I haven't argued the point very well. When I read your last paragraph above, I see a farily good description of compatibilism, so my hope is that you'll reconsider your philosophical commitment to libertarian free will in light of the biblical doctrine that you know.

Cheers,
Bob

[Guest]

Bob is presented with choice C at event E. Choice C entails choosing one of three alternatives. It is completely up to Bob which way to go. Based his desires, motivation, reasoning ability, loyalties, perception, etc., he could choose alternative C1, alternative C2, or alternative C3. God happens to know ahead of time that Bob will choose C2. Bob freely chooses C2, and God knows it will happen, but Bob very well could have chosen C1 or C3. But the fact is that he chooses C2, and God passively knows this.

If Bob "could have chosen C1", then if he had chosen C1, what would become of God's foreknowledge? Would God have made a mistake?

If God knew that Bob would choose C2, then Bob's choice of C2 at time E was TRUE prior to time E. In that case, Bob logically could not have chosen C1 at time E. For if he had, this would contradict the statement that he chooses C2 at time E.

Prior to time E, Bob hasn't made a choice. So a statement about what choice Bob makes at time E cannot be true of false prior to time E. The statement becomes true of false at time E when Bob makes his choice.

If a statement about future choice is neither true nor false prior to the moment of decision, then, since it has not truth value, there is nothing to know. Knowing whether proposition P is true or false implies a truth value for proposition P.

It may be that "assertions" about future choice (or even statements about future events) may not actually be assertions at all, but predictions.

[Guest]

Bob is presented with choice C at event E. Choice C entails choosing one of three alternatives. It is completely up to Bob which way to go. Based his desires, motivation, reasoning ability, loyalties, perception, etc., he could choose alternative C1, alternative C2, or alternative C3. God happens to know ahead of time that Bob will choose C2. Bob freely chooses C2, and God knows it will happen, but Bob very well could have chosen C1 or C3. But the fact is that he chooses C2, and God passively knows this.

If Bob "could have chosen C1", then if he had chosen C1, what would become of God's foreknowledge? Would God have made a mistake?

Yes. Or more precisely, God would have held a false belief, and by the definition of omniscience, God holds no false beliefs.

If God knew that Bob would choose C2, then Bob's choice of C2 at time E was TRUE prior to time E. In that case, Bob logically could not have chosen C1 at time E. For if he had, this would contradict the statement that he chooses C2 at time E.

Yes, exactly.

Prior to time E, Bob hasn't made a choice. So a statement about what choice Bob makes at time E cannot be true of false prior to time E. The statement becomes true of false at time E when Bob makes his choice.

This is the Open Theist argument, so I assume you are an Open Theist and deny the classical doctrine of God's exhaustive foreknowledge of the future.

Your assertion however only holds if indeterminism is true. If some form of determinism is true, then it doesn't hold.

If a statement about future choice is neither true nor false prior to the moment of decision, then, since it has not truth value, there is nothing to know. Knowing whether proposition P is true or false implies a truth value for proposition P.

Yes, this is true analytically. Of course, the definition of foreknowledge is that a statement about a future choice *does have* a truth value, and thus God can (and must, since He is omniscient) know it.

Cheers,
Bob

[Guest]

I just started a new thread, with a thought from the debate. Here's the link.