Doug Wilson's "pennies"
Posted: Mon Jun 01, 2020 3:05 pm
Doug Wilson’s “tossed pennies” illustration
Steve,
In your debate with Douglas Wilson on Calvinism, you affirmed that God knows the future decisions we will make, but does not determine them, because we have free will. Doug responded (quite reasonably, it seems to me) that if you had a handful of pennies and tossed them on a staircase, they would land in different places on the staircase, some heads, some tails, in a very complex arrangement. If you knew in advance, however, how each penny would land, and tossed them anyway, then by tossing coins whose final position was known to you, you have actually determined that each coin would fall in its assigned position. Thus, your foreknowledge of the end makes you the determiner of that end, if you know the end before you toss.
Jeremy
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Hi Jeremy,
It is true that God seems to give more opportunities to make the right choices to some than He gives to others. I don't know why He does so, since those with the most opportunities often are lost nonetheless (like Israel, in the Old Testament). This is why some are more accountable than are others. The abundance of grace and opportunity given does not necessarily correspond to individual responses. I presume that the thieves on either side of Christ's cross, both had equal opportunity to observe Christ and to form their opinions of Him. One chose to worship Him and the other chose differently.
I don't know why some are given more prevenient grace than are others, but Jesus "draws all men to Himself" without all responding favorably to Him. To analyze all the factors that make one person stubborn and another compliant, or that make one person love evil and cruelty, while another is drawn to goodness and kindness, would be a psychoanalytical task too complex for any of us to attempt.
That God knows some will choose rebellion while others choose submission to Him does not make Him the determiner of any of these decisions—even if He knows them well in advance. Wilson's illustration of the pennies thrown on the stairs was not relevant to the Calvinist/Arminian controversy. He was saying, if one knew in advance the way each penny would land, and threw them anyway, then that person has determined how they would land. This is logically false. It is chance and natural law that determines how each penny would land. Suppose I know in advance that I get to keep all the pennies that land heads-up, and the ones that land tails-up will be lost to me—and suppose that I know already (supernaturally) how many will land in each position. I would certainly prefer that they all land heads-up. However, foreknowing that I would only get a fraction of the pennies, I might well decide that it would be worth it to throw the lot anyway.
In doing so, I have not, thereby, caused any penny to land either heads-up or tails-up. My throwing them determines only that the pennies will land one way or another. I have not determined how any of them will land—which is an outcome determined by other factors in nature. Thus I have determined that the toss will take place, though I might wish the results had turned out more in my favor. The only thing that I am determining is that the project will not be abandoned, simply because I will not get all the pennies. I may judge that some pennies are better than none.
Thus Doug's illustration proves no such point as would help Calvinism. Even Arminians believe that God, knowing full well the outcomes, determined that the project would go forward. Calvinists add that God has determined specifically the place and orientation of each penny, including the determination that certain pennies, which He had the power to make turn-up "heads," should "according to His purpose and good pleasurel" nonetheless must turn-up "tails." In Calvinism, God controls every detail.
The illustration does not tie foreknowledge with predetermination, as Doug believes it does. If tossing the coins is said to determine where and how each will land, then this is equally true whether I know the outcome in advance or not. Whether foreknowing, or not foreknowing, it is my casting the handful that results in their disbursement. However, they are no longer in my control from the second they leave my hand. I have determined to toss them, but have not determined how they will fall. And this is equally true whether I know in advance how they will land or I do not know. The only difference in the experiment, if we add a factor of my foreknowing the outcomes, is that my tossing them means I approve of the toss being made, and will tolerate a less-than-perfect outcome which is foreknown by me. I still have no power over how any given coin will land, even if I have some power of foreseeing it. Seeing is not determining.
In giving men free will, God excludes the possibility of His forcing all the coins to turn up as He prefers. But by setting the project in motion, in the Garden of Eden, He determined that human decisions will be made—some good, some disappointing— though He has not determined or controlled the outcome for even one penny. It then can be said that He has determined that every person will choose, but not how every person will choose. The latter He has left to us.
Steve,
In your debate with Douglas Wilson on Calvinism, you affirmed that God knows the future decisions we will make, but does not determine them, because we have free will. Doug responded (quite reasonably, it seems to me) that if you had a handful of pennies and tossed them on a staircase, they would land in different places on the staircase, some heads, some tails, in a very complex arrangement. If you knew in advance, however, how each penny would land, and tossed them anyway, then by tossing coins whose final position was known to you, you have actually determined that each coin would fall in its assigned position. Thus, your foreknowledge of the end makes you the determiner of that end, if you know the end before you toss.
Jeremy
----------------------------------------------------
Hi Jeremy,
It is true that God seems to give more opportunities to make the right choices to some than He gives to others. I don't know why He does so, since those with the most opportunities often are lost nonetheless (like Israel, in the Old Testament). This is why some are more accountable than are others. The abundance of grace and opportunity given does not necessarily correspond to individual responses. I presume that the thieves on either side of Christ's cross, both had equal opportunity to observe Christ and to form their opinions of Him. One chose to worship Him and the other chose differently.
I don't know why some are given more prevenient grace than are others, but Jesus "draws all men to Himself" without all responding favorably to Him. To analyze all the factors that make one person stubborn and another compliant, or that make one person love evil and cruelty, while another is drawn to goodness and kindness, would be a psychoanalytical task too complex for any of us to attempt.
That God knows some will choose rebellion while others choose submission to Him does not make Him the determiner of any of these decisions—even if He knows them well in advance. Wilson's illustration of the pennies thrown on the stairs was not relevant to the Calvinist/Arminian controversy. He was saying, if one knew in advance the way each penny would land, and threw them anyway, then that person has determined how they would land. This is logically false. It is chance and natural law that determines how each penny would land. Suppose I know in advance that I get to keep all the pennies that land heads-up, and the ones that land tails-up will be lost to me—and suppose that I know already (supernaturally) how many will land in each position. I would certainly prefer that they all land heads-up. However, foreknowing that I would only get a fraction of the pennies, I might well decide that it would be worth it to throw the lot anyway.
In doing so, I have not, thereby, caused any penny to land either heads-up or tails-up. My throwing them determines only that the pennies will land one way or another. I have not determined how any of them will land—which is an outcome determined by other factors in nature. Thus I have determined that the toss will take place, though I might wish the results had turned out more in my favor. The only thing that I am determining is that the project will not be abandoned, simply because I will not get all the pennies. I may judge that some pennies are better than none.
Thus Doug's illustration proves no such point as would help Calvinism. Even Arminians believe that God, knowing full well the outcomes, determined that the project would go forward. Calvinists add that God has determined specifically the place and orientation of each penny, including the determination that certain pennies, which He had the power to make turn-up "heads," should "according to His purpose and good pleasurel" nonetheless must turn-up "tails." In Calvinism, God controls every detail.
The illustration does not tie foreknowledge with predetermination, as Doug believes it does. If tossing the coins is said to determine where and how each will land, then this is equally true whether I know the outcome in advance or not. Whether foreknowing, or not foreknowing, it is my casting the handful that results in their disbursement. However, they are no longer in my control from the second they leave my hand. I have determined to toss them, but have not determined how they will fall. And this is equally true whether I know in advance how they will land or I do not know. The only difference in the experiment, if we add a factor of my foreknowing the outcomes, is that my tossing them means I approve of the toss being made, and will tolerate a less-than-perfect outcome which is foreknown by me. I still have no power over how any given coin will land, even if I have some power of foreseeing it. Seeing is not determining.
In giving men free will, God excludes the possibility of His forcing all the coins to turn up as He prefers. But by setting the project in motion, in the Garden of Eden, He determined that human decisions will be made—some good, some disappointing— though He has not determined or controlled the outcome for even one penny. It then can be said that He has determined that every person will choose, but not how every person will choose. The latter He has left to us.