Open Theists believe in the Omniscience of God

[Guest]

Open Theists believe in the Omniscience of God

It is commonly assumed among those who do not understand Open Theism, that its proponents do not believe in God’s omniscience. This is a mistake assumption. Open theists, like nearly all other Christians do believe in the omniscience of God.

Disagreement with Calvinists, Arminians, and Molinists does not concern the scope of God’s knowledge, but rather the content of reality. Open theists do not believe that statements about future freely-chosen actions have present truth value. Rather statements about future freely-chosen actions either express intention or prediction.

In formal logic, all statements do have truth value, and the law of the excluded middle requires all statements to be either true or false. If we accept this description of statements, then open theists must exclude sentences about future freely-chosen acts from the category of “statements”. Perhaps they can be better classified as “meta-statements.”

It seems obvious that if meta-statements about future actions of a person have truth value now, then the person does not have free will. For example, if it is now true that Joe will raise his hand tomorrow morning, then Joe cannot refrain from raising his hand tomorrow morning. (This "can't" is not a matter of inability, but is a matter of logical contradiction") For, if he refrains from raising his hand tomorrow morning then it is not now true that he will raise his hand tomorrow morning. Similarly, if it is now false that Joe will raise his hand tomorrow morning, then he cannot raise his hand at that time. Thus, in either case, there is something Joe cannot do, and so he not have the freedom to choose. Thus there is a logical contradiction between statements about future actions of people having present truth value, and freedom of choice. This argument logically extends to all other meta-statements about future actions of people, for other meta-statements are not of a different order, and thus cannot be excluded.

For one to know that a statement is true, it is a necessary condition that the statement is, in fact, true. For example, I may claim that I know that my wife is now at home. However, if you prove to me that she is not at home, then I will no longer claim that I know that she is at home. I can only say that I thought I knew. Similarly, If one knows that a statement is false, then the statement is, necessarily, false. No one can know the truth value of a “statement” which is neither true nor false (hereafter called “meta-statement”). Meta-statements have no truth value. So there is nothing to know!

The statement that my wife is now at home does have a truth value. It is either true or false. Thus it is possible to know that my wife is at home ---- or that she is not at home. However, the meta-statent that my wife will use the internet tomorrow does not have a truth value. It is not actually a statement about what will absolutely occur. It is a prediction. It may be a very good prediction (based on her past actions, or knowing her character). But my wife may not use the internet tomorrow. She may choose to do something else instead. Whether or not my wife will use the internet tomorrow cannot be known.

Other “statements” about freely-chosen future actions may express intentions. I may say, “I am going to town tomorrow.” This meta-statement will become a statement with truth value when I have made my choice.

When God makes statements about future actions of people, He is not making an absolute statement about what necessarily must occur. Rather He is making a prediction of what will probably occur. His prediction is based on all the information He possesses concerning the people involved and the related circumstances (and that is exhaustive information). Thus God’s predictions are much more likely to come true than predictions made by anyone else. For everyone else’s knowledge of the people involved and the related circumstances is limited. However, regardless of whether the relevant knowledge is exhaustive or limited, the people about whom the prediction is made may choose to do otherwise, and so the prediction will not be actualized. Here is one record in which God thought something would happen, and the opposite occurred.

"I thought, ‘After she [Israel] has done all these things she will return to Me’; but she did not return … Jeremiah 3:10 NASB

I know the King James and related versions (Douay, JB2000, KJ21, NKJV, RWebster) translate “Return to me” as if it were a command, but the imperative mode is used neither in the Hebrew nor in the Septuagint. Other translations have either “I thought (or “said”) ‘… she will return to me’…” or “I thought (or “said”) ‘…she would return to me’...” These translations include ASV, Darby, ESV, JPS (Jewish Publication Society), NASB, NIV, RSV, NRSV.

Personally, I see the denotation of “meta-statement” as extending to all statements about future events, not merely those about freely-chosen future actions, the reason being that free agents may intervene in events, or God may intervene or God may change His mind. Even astronomical events which seem to be totally predictable and inevitable, may not occur if God should intervene, or if man should intervene (by way of gigantic nuclear explosions, for example).

However, God makes some statements about His future intentions about which He states that He will not change His mind. Such statements, and only such statements, would seem to be exceptions to my suggestion that all statements about future events are really “meta-statements” with no truth value.

To affirm that God knows the logically unknowable, that is, that He knows the truth value of meta-statements which have no truth value, is inherently self-contradictory. Thus, saying that God does not know people’s future choices no more sets limits on God’s omniscience than to affirm that God cannot create a stone so large that He can’t lift it, sets limits on His omnipotence.

However, God does know everyone’s present intentions, and those intentions usually to lead to future fulfillment.

[Guest]

Thanks, Paidion, for this clear and concise (as is possible) summary.

I likely will have some questions, but I cannot formulate them right now.

TK

[Guest]

To affirm that God knows the logically unknowable, that is, that He knows the truth value of meta-statements which have no truth value, is inherently self-contradictory. Thus, saying that God does not know people’s future choices no more sets limits on God’s omniscience than to affirm that God cannot create a stone so large that He can’t lift it, sets limits on His omnipotence.

As I'm reading what you wrote Paidion, this exact comparison also occurred to me. Kudos for a case well made.

Dave

[Guest]

In regard to God's omnipotence, could God create a stone that was so heavy that He could ALMOST not lift it?

TK

[Guest]

To affirm that God knows the logically unknowable, that is, that He knows the truth value of meta-statements which have no truth value, is inherently self-contradictory.

If future free choices of individuals have no truth value, then it does not count against God's omniscience that He doesn't know them.

The problem with Open Theism is not that it is not logically consistent; it is. The problem is that it is not biblical.

Cheers,
Bob

[Guest]

Paidion,

While it is certainly beneficial to rely on logic and reason, logic has its limits. Your oft-repeated illustration regarding God being unable to make a stone so large He cannot lift it reminds me of the illustration regarding logic.

The following statement is false if it is true, and true if it is false:

This statement is false.

Applying our human logic to someone who is "other" may not always work; aren't miracles illogical? Hume thought so. The scriptures are full of things that defy the logic of the skeptics.

Please do not misunderstand me; I know you are a believer.

Blessings, Homer

[Guest]

The following statement is false if it is true, and true if it is false:

This statement is false.

So it would seem that the sentence you quoted in red cannot be either true of false since if it were either, it would be self-contradictory. Thus
(like statements about future acts of people), though it is in the form of a statement, it does not qualify as a statement but belongs in the category of "meta-statements".

[Guest]

The problem with Open Theism is not that it is not logically consistent; it is. The problem is that it is not biblical.

Gregory Boyd in his article supporting "the open theism view" in the book Divine Foreknowledge Four Views makes a pretty good case for it being biblical.

[Guest]

bshow1:

You cant deal with Paidion's argument by simply stating it's not biblical. it's a little bit more complex than that.

You'll have to explain how, if God knows in advance every thing that will ever happen, how 1) that affords us any dignity; 2) how we have free choice(especially since the Bible seems to give men free choice, e.g. Deut. 28 ), 3) how God is not the most supremely bored entity in the universe, and 4) How God is any different from a brat pulling the wings off of helpless butterflies.

Of course I do not believe any of the above propositions, But if God has set up everything like a long line of dominoes, i dont see how you escape those conclusions.

TK

[Guest]

You also have to wonder what providential advantage it gives God to have exhaustive definite foreknowledge of all things that would come to pass before the ages began. If he foreknows everything, then there is nothing that can happen other than what He knows will happen. If God's own acts are included in His foreknowledge, then it would appear that not even God can do other than what He knows He will do. It would seem to follow from this that this type of foreknowledge undermines His sovereignty, because He is not free to do other than what He knows He would (Has already done in His own mind) do.