"In compatibilism, man is free to do whatever he wants, but not free to want whatever he wants. That is to say, man has freedom to exercise his will in accordance with his desires, but he has no control over those desires. Since man cannot manipulate those desires, and man is not naturally inclined toward God, the compatibilist Christian maintains that man will never freely respond to God on his own."
"To say that man is free to do what he wants, but not free to want what he wants, is to say that man is not genuinely free to make undetermined choices. It is for precisely this reason that compatibilism is often referred to as 'soft-determinism'".
http://sbctoday.com/2012/06/24/a-commen ... %E2%80%9D/
Of course a problem with this view is since God determines the factors that necessarily determine our will, desires, and choices, God is responsible for our choices, which makes God the author of many very bad choices (and lets us off the hook).
Letter to a Calvinist
Re: Letter to a Calvinist
Let me boldly state the obvious. If you are not sure whether you heard directly from God, you didn’t.
~Garry Friesen
~Garry Friesen
Re: Letter to a Calvinist
Psimmond,
I agree with the conclusion of that second quotation. The way that I would cache out this particular problem of compatibilism is by saying that moral responsibility is transitive.
Here is what I mean by transitivity: Imagine that you have a series of causes A, B, and C, where causation happens in this order:
A-->B -->C
A causes B, and B causes C. In this case, we can say that A causes C because causation is a transitive relation. It is also true that A causes C by means of causing B, and so it does not cause C directly. Nonetheless, it is accurate and correct to say that A causes C. Much of science, in fact, is an attempt to take an observed phenomenon (in this case, perhaps it would be C)and to discover where the transitive causal chain ultimately begins (in this case, A).
So hopefully this example using causation is a clear enough illustration of what it means to say that something is transitive. To say that moral responsibility is transitive, then, is to make a similar claim about the nature of acts that I perform, and to say that I must be morally responsible for some part of a process in which my actions are the final result.
Imagine, then, that I do X in a certain scenario (say, I pull the trigger of a gun). Am I morally responsible for doing X? If I am to be so, then I must either be responsible for directly bringing about X or I must be responsible for bringing about something which resulted in the occurrence of X. If X is the pulling of a gun trigger, then we typically say that moral responsibility occurs at the point where I decide to pull the trigger, after which a series of mental and physical processes occur (mental events, neural events, and bodily events). The important point about these subsequent events is that I do not have direct control over them. I don't control whether a particular neural event brings about a particular bodily movement (at least on most views of the soul's relationship to the body). Thus, I am not directly but rather am indirectly responsible for the electrical signals that trace down my arm and that must lead to my finger pulling the trigger, due to the transitivity of moral responsibility that begins with my decision to do X and results ultimately in the bodily event of my doing X.
What we have already said about moral responsibility is that it requires the ability to do otherwise. Note, it does not require the ability to do otherwise at each step in the process of an action that I perform. Rather, it requires only that there be a particular step over which I do, in fact, have control, which entails "the ability to do otherwise." The problem for compatibilism is that even if my actions are in line with my desires, there must be some point in the process over which I have control in order for me to be morally responsible for actions which I perform that originate with my having a desire. It is not enough that I both desire to do X and that I do X. Rather, I must have been able to originate an action to do otherwise at some point in the process or I will not be morally responsible. Whether this means choosing my desires, deciding to act on my desires, etc., the compatibilist will not escape the conclusion that I am un-free (and therefore not responsible) unless he finds a point at which I have the ability to originate an alternative action.
The transitivity of moral responsibility, then, ultimately traces back to God if I am only able to act in line with my desires and he is the one who causes my desires, or if he creates me in a situation where he knows that my desires will be determined by my circumstances, and he is the one who created those circumstances.
The incompatibilist can explain how I am morally responsible for my actions through the transitivity of moral responsibility, but the compatibilist has no way of tracing moral responsibility back to a suitable starting point over which the agent has genuine control and the ability to do otherwise.
I agree with the conclusion of that second quotation. The way that I would cache out this particular problem of compatibilism is by saying that moral responsibility is transitive.
Here is what I mean by transitivity: Imagine that you have a series of causes A, B, and C, where causation happens in this order:
A-->B -->C
A causes B, and B causes C. In this case, we can say that A causes C because causation is a transitive relation. It is also true that A causes C by means of causing B, and so it does not cause C directly. Nonetheless, it is accurate and correct to say that A causes C. Much of science, in fact, is an attempt to take an observed phenomenon (in this case, perhaps it would be C)and to discover where the transitive causal chain ultimately begins (in this case, A).
So hopefully this example using causation is a clear enough illustration of what it means to say that something is transitive. To say that moral responsibility is transitive, then, is to make a similar claim about the nature of acts that I perform, and to say that I must be morally responsible for some part of a process in which my actions are the final result.
Imagine, then, that I do X in a certain scenario (say, I pull the trigger of a gun). Am I morally responsible for doing X? If I am to be so, then I must either be responsible for directly bringing about X or I must be responsible for bringing about something which resulted in the occurrence of X. If X is the pulling of a gun trigger, then we typically say that moral responsibility occurs at the point where I decide to pull the trigger, after which a series of mental and physical processes occur (mental events, neural events, and bodily events). The important point about these subsequent events is that I do not have direct control over them. I don't control whether a particular neural event brings about a particular bodily movement (at least on most views of the soul's relationship to the body). Thus, I am not directly but rather am indirectly responsible for the electrical signals that trace down my arm and that must lead to my finger pulling the trigger, due to the transitivity of moral responsibility that begins with my decision to do X and results ultimately in the bodily event of my doing X.
What we have already said about moral responsibility is that it requires the ability to do otherwise. Note, it does not require the ability to do otherwise at each step in the process of an action that I perform. Rather, it requires only that there be a particular step over which I do, in fact, have control, which entails "the ability to do otherwise." The problem for compatibilism is that even if my actions are in line with my desires, there must be some point in the process over which I have control in order for me to be morally responsible for actions which I perform that originate with my having a desire. It is not enough that I both desire to do X and that I do X. Rather, I must have been able to originate an action to do otherwise at some point in the process or I will not be morally responsible. Whether this means choosing my desires, deciding to act on my desires, etc., the compatibilist will not escape the conclusion that I am un-free (and therefore not responsible) unless he finds a point at which I have the ability to originate an alternative action.
The transitivity of moral responsibility, then, ultimately traces back to God if I am only able to act in line with my desires and he is the one who causes my desires, or if he creates me in a situation where he knows that my desires will be determined by my circumstances, and he is the one who created those circumstances.
The incompatibilist can explain how I am morally responsible for my actions through the transitivity of moral responsibility, but the compatibilist has no way of tracing moral responsibility back to a suitable starting point over which the agent has genuine control and the ability to do otherwise.
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Re: Letter to a Calvinist
I agree with youpsimmond wrote:Of course a problem with this view is since God determines the factors that necessarily determine our will, desires, and choices, God is responsible for our choices, which makes God the author of many very bad choices (and lets us off the hook).
Remember those wacky Doctor Seuss contraptions? They are amusing in cartoons, but they’re not amusing in theology. Calvinists (desperate to extract themselves from the trap their theology places them in) fabricated the Seuss-like gadget called compatibilism. But it works no better than the Doctor’s gizmos.
The trap that Calvinists place themselves in is that by making God meticulously determinative of all things, He becomes (logically) responsible for all human thought and action, including, therefore, all sin. Some Calvinists, embarrassed that their theology so clearly defames God, but unwilling to admit their error, concocted compatibilism. And they seriously imagine that it actually works.
Calvinism says God meticulously determines all things, allows man no free will, but still holds him responsible for sin. Compatibilists (adding a new doohickey to Calvin’s thingamajig) say, “Well actually, God determines everything indirectly, therefore making man responsible for sin. You see,” they clarify (imagining that their clarification actually clarifies), “man can choose, but God has limited and arranged all of his choices in such a way that he cannot choose good, and cannot choose God. Therefore, God is not responsible for sin; man is.”
Isn’t that like the boy who poked his friend with a stick and then said, “I didn’t poke you; the stick did?” That’s the logic of compatibilism.
Re: Letter to a Calvinist
Timm001, thanks for reviving the discussion, and apologies for the belated response. I thought your contributions have been very helpful. I want to respond to your syllogism, which I have placed between horizontal lines below.
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1. If I am morally responsible for doing X, then I must be able to refrain from doing X. (stipulation granted by CThomas)
2. I am morally responsible for doing X. (stipulation)
3. Therefore, I can refrain from doing X. (follows from 1 and 2)
4. God decrees that I do X. (stipulation)
5. If God decrees that I do X, then I cannot refrain from doing X. (definition of "decree")
6. Therefore, I cannot refrain from doing X. (follows from 5)
7. Therefore, I can refrain from doing X and I cannot refrain from doing X. (follows from 3 and 6)
And the further contradiction about moral responsibility is as such:
8. I am morally responsible for doing X and I am not morally responsible for doing X (follows from 7)
Thus, I am both able and not able to refrain from doing X, which makes me both morally responsible and not morally responsible for doing X. We can see, then, that the notion of moral responsibility as the ability to act otherwise leads to a direct contradiction when paired with a view of God's decreeing as not leaving the option of acting otherwise.
Now it is up to CThomas to show that "the ability to do otherwise" is strictly a part of the incompatibilist view, so that we must be assuming incompatibilism in order to run this argument. Or, alternatively, to show that it is only the incompatibilist who assumes that God's "decreeing" an action means that I am unable to act against God's decrees. If CThomas is unable to do this, then we have shown that we can argue that God's decreeing of all that we do is contradictory to our being morally responsible agents without assuming incompatibilism.
--------------------------------------
Back to me, CThomas here. The problem with the argument above, as I see it, is that I think that premise 5 is incorrect, and does not follow from the definition of "decree." I think that, in order to follow from 4, you would need to re-word 5 in the following way: "If God decrees that I do X, then I will do X." It does not follow from that re-formulated 5 that you were unable to refrain from doing X except on the assumption of incompatibilism, which is the very point at issue, so neither 6 nor 7 nor the contradiction with 3 follows. The compatibilist says that God can decree the volitional event X, but that X is nonetheless free because the decree is a decree governing the volition rather than any sort of external compulsion. It follows that, because the agent made the choice to do X (whether that choice was itself decreed or not), it was within the agent's ability to make the opposite choice. All that the compatibilist views as necessary for the choice to be free is that it is the result of the agent's ordinary decisionmaking apparatus. The compatibilist would say (in my opinion correctly) that if you choose to do something in the ordinary sense (you think over your options and then decide with no external compulsion to do it) then it was plainly within your power to do the opposite, even if the choice you made was fore-ordained by an external decision.
I hope this doesn't come across as cavalier, because these are certainly difficult issues. But I'm not yet persuaded!
CThomas
--------------------------------------
1. If I am morally responsible for doing X, then I must be able to refrain from doing X. (stipulation granted by CThomas)
2. I am morally responsible for doing X. (stipulation)
3. Therefore, I can refrain from doing X. (follows from 1 and 2)
4. God decrees that I do X. (stipulation)
5. If God decrees that I do X, then I cannot refrain from doing X. (definition of "decree")
6. Therefore, I cannot refrain from doing X. (follows from 5)
7. Therefore, I can refrain from doing X and I cannot refrain from doing X. (follows from 3 and 6)
And the further contradiction about moral responsibility is as such:
8. I am morally responsible for doing X and I am not morally responsible for doing X (follows from 7)
Thus, I am both able and not able to refrain from doing X, which makes me both morally responsible and not morally responsible for doing X. We can see, then, that the notion of moral responsibility as the ability to act otherwise leads to a direct contradiction when paired with a view of God's decreeing as not leaving the option of acting otherwise.
Now it is up to CThomas to show that "the ability to do otherwise" is strictly a part of the incompatibilist view, so that we must be assuming incompatibilism in order to run this argument. Or, alternatively, to show that it is only the incompatibilist who assumes that God's "decreeing" an action means that I am unable to act against God's decrees. If CThomas is unable to do this, then we have shown that we can argue that God's decreeing of all that we do is contradictory to our being morally responsible agents without assuming incompatibilism.
--------------------------------------
Back to me, CThomas here. The problem with the argument above, as I see it, is that I think that premise 5 is incorrect, and does not follow from the definition of "decree." I think that, in order to follow from 4, you would need to re-word 5 in the following way: "If God decrees that I do X, then I will do X." It does not follow from that re-formulated 5 that you were unable to refrain from doing X except on the assumption of incompatibilism, which is the very point at issue, so neither 6 nor 7 nor the contradiction with 3 follows. The compatibilist says that God can decree the volitional event X, but that X is nonetheless free because the decree is a decree governing the volition rather than any sort of external compulsion. It follows that, because the agent made the choice to do X (whether that choice was itself decreed or not), it was within the agent's ability to make the opposite choice. All that the compatibilist views as necessary for the choice to be free is that it is the result of the agent's ordinary decisionmaking apparatus. The compatibilist would say (in my opinion correctly) that if you choose to do something in the ordinary sense (you think over your options and then decide with no external compulsion to do it) then it was plainly within your power to do the opposite, even if the choice you made was fore-ordained by an external decision.
I hope this doesn't come across as cavalier, because these are certainly difficult issues. But I'm not yet persuaded!
CThomas
Re: Letter to a Calvinist
CThomas,
Thanks for responding. I think that your comments will help us to move forward in the discussion.
There are two basic replies that I want to give. The first is that I believe your notion of "decree" to be inadequate for your purposes, though I am glad that you clarified what you mean by the term--as it is relevant to deciding whether or not God's decreeing makes us un-free. Second, I disagree with your characterization of how compatibilism preserves free will.
Let me start with the first of these. Here is the relevant portion of what you said:
The reason that this is a problem for your view is very straightforward: I, as an incompatibilist, agree entirely with your reformulation. Further, I agree that it renders my argument invalid. However, the problem with the statement "If God decrees that I do X, then I will do X" is that it is does not express determinism. The thing about compatibilism is that it is a form of determinism. It is called "soft determinism" because compatibilists claim (as the title of their position suggests) that free will is compatible with determinism. Therefore, compatibilists say that it is possible to provide an adequate account of determinism (in which things must happen a certain way, either because they are logically necessary, metaphysically necessary, or because they are governed by laws of cause and effect) alongside an adequate account of free will, and thereby demonstrate that the two are not contradictory. What you have provided is an inadequate account of determinism, because I can, as an incompatibilist, stipulate that "decree" simply means "foreknow" and reformulate premise 5 in the same way:
If God knows that I will do X, then I will do X.
Now, I take it that you as a compatibilist do not think that God's foreknowledge is incompatible with free will. Here I would agree with you. I think that God has exhaustive foreknowledge of the future. But this is because I think that God can know the future in a way that does not compromise our free will, and that is also non-deterministic. Therefore, this premise presupposes neither compatibilism nor incompatibilism. Most compatibilists simply deny the contradiction between causation/determinism and foreknowledge. Your reformulation of the relevant "decree" premise seems rather to deny determinism.
The challenge for you, then, is to explain how "decree" means something more than "foreknow" (which I agree that it does), so that my interpretation and reformulation of premise 5 is not the same as yours. You further must fill out our understanding of "decree" in a way that does not rule out our having "the ability to do otherwise."
The second reply that I would give is more along traditional lines of dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Here is the other relevant portion of what you said:
I am afraid that the rest of your statement seems mainly to beg the question and assume that compatibilism is consistent with free will, rather than to show it. You use the term "volition," and say that God can "decree" our volitions. But if by a "volition" you mean a "free choice" or a "free decision," then I would dispute this claim. God cannot decree a volition because my volition originates with me, not with God. Free will includes the idea that the agent acts as a cause in a fundamental sense which rules out anyone/anything else causing him to act. It is difficult to see how God can "decree" my actions without in some sense "causing" my actions. In that case, God's causing my actions is not unlike a physical process in my brain causing them.
"Even if the choice you made was foreordained by an external decision." I do not see how it is in my power to "do the opposite" if God foreordains my action. Perhaps you can provide a definition of "foreordain" which does in fact show that I have the ability to act against God's ordinances. However, if I am able to do so, then how are God's ordinances anything more than the ordinances of a human being? If someone deludes himself into think he has the power to foreordain the future and then starts making proclamations, then it's clear that his proclamations wont require anyone to do what he says. I can certainly act in a way which contradicts a crazy person's "foreordination." But presumably there is something more to God's foreordaining of future events. But what precisely is it? Even more, how can it be something stronger without violating my ability to do otherwise?
The fundamental problem is that compatibilism affirms determinism and free will, which seem contradictory. There is no "ability to do otherwise" if all of your actions are necessitated (whether by God's decrees or the laws of nature). Further, you are not free if your actions are caused, or if they take place through anything other than your own self-initiation, which cannot come about because of God's decisions. Otherwise, it is not self-initiation.
Thanks for responding. I think that your comments will help us to move forward in the discussion.
There are two basic replies that I want to give. The first is that I believe your notion of "decree" to be inadequate for your purposes, though I am glad that you clarified what you mean by the term--as it is relevant to deciding whether or not God's decreeing makes us un-free. Second, I disagree with your characterization of how compatibilism preserves free will.
Let me start with the first of these. Here is the relevant portion of what you said:
I am afraid that your reformulation of premise 5 is problematic for your view. In fact, I think that if we simply go by what you said there, then it will turn out that you are not a compatibilist. You suggested the following revision: "If God decrees that I do X, then I will do X." I think that you will agree with me that this is a not a definition of decree, but only a true statement about the things which God decrees. That is, we would need to add more content to our concept of "decree" in order to truly fill out the meaning of the term.CThomas wrote:Back to me, CThomas here. The problem with the argument above, as I see it, is that I think that premise 5 is incorrect, and does not follow from the definition of "decree." I think that, in order to follow from 4, you would need to re-word 5 in the following way: "If God decrees that I do X, then I will do X." It does not follow from that re-formulated 5 that you were unable to refrain from doing X except on the assumption of incompatibilism, which is the very point at issue, so neither 6 nor 7 nor the contradiction with 3 follows. CThomas
The reason that this is a problem for your view is very straightforward: I, as an incompatibilist, agree entirely with your reformulation. Further, I agree that it renders my argument invalid. However, the problem with the statement "If God decrees that I do X, then I will do X" is that it is does not express determinism. The thing about compatibilism is that it is a form of determinism. It is called "soft determinism" because compatibilists claim (as the title of their position suggests) that free will is compatible with determinism. Therefore, compatibilists say that it is possible to provide an adequate account of determinism (in which things must happen a certain way, either because they are logically necessary, metaphysically necessary, or because they are governed by laws of cause and effect) alongside an adequate account of free will, and thereby demonstrate that the two are not contradictory. What you have provided is an inadequate account of determinism, because I can, as an incompatibilist, stipulate that "decree" simply means "foreknow" and reformulate premise 5 in the same way:
If God knows that I will do X, then I will do X.
Now, I take it that you as a compatibilist do not think that God's foreknowledge is incompatible with free will. Here I would agree with you. I think that God has exhaustive foreknowledge of the future. But this is because I think that God can know the future in a way that does not compromise our free will, and that is also non-deterministic. Therefore, this premise presupposes neither compatibilism nor incompatibilism. Most compatibilists simply deny the contradiction between causation/determinism and foreknowledge. Your reformulation of the relevant "decree" premise seems rather to deny determinism.
The challenge for you, then, is to explain how "decree" means something more than "foreknow" (which I agree that it does), so that my interpretation and reformulation of premise 5 is not the same as yours. You further must fill out our understanding of "decree" in a way that does not rule out our having "the ability to do otherwise."
The second reply that I would give is more along traditional lines of dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Here is the other relevant portion of what you said:
"All that the compatibilist views as necessary for the choice to be free is that it is the result of the agent's ordinary decisionmaking apparatus." I will take it that by "decisionmaking" you mean "deliberative," because it is an open question as to whether compatibilism truly grants one the ability to make decisions. Deliberation, instead, simply means the ability to entertain (or, in a weaker sense, to be aware of) various options. It seems fairly clear that entertaining different options is not sufficient for freedom. Addicts prove this every day, as they are aware of their options but nonetheless act out of compulsion. Or, if you think that addiction is too difficult of a case to argue, then it is possible to think of a hypothetical example in which two options are present before your mind, you deliberate about them, and then a random brain process directly causes you to take one of the options. Therefore, deliberation is certainly not sufficient for free will.CThomas wrote:The compatibilist says that God can decree the volitional event X, but that X is nonetheless free because the decree is a decree governing the volition rather than any sort of external compulsion. It follows that, because the agent made the choice to do X (whether that choice was itself decreed or not), it was within the agent's ability to make the opposite choice. All that the compatibilist views as necessary for the choice to be free is that it is the result of the agent's ordinary decisionmaking apparatus. The compatibilist would say (in my opinion correctly) that if you choose to do something in the ordinary sense (you think over your options and then decide with no external compulsion to do it) then it was plainly within your power to do the opposite, even if the choice you made was fore-ordained by an external decision. CThomas
I am afraid that the rest of your statement seems mainly to beg the question and assume that compatibilism is consistent with free will, rather than to show it. You use the term "volition," and say that God can "decree" our volitions. But if by a "volition" you mean a "free choice" or a "free decision," then I would dispute this claim. God cannot decree a volition because my volition originates with me, not with God. Free will includes the idea that the agent acts as a cause in a fundamental sense which rules out anyone/anything else causing him to act. It is difficult to see how God can "decree" my actions without in some sense "causing" my actions. In that case, God's causing my actions is not unlike a physical process in my brain causing them.
"Even if the choice you made was foreordained by an external decision." I do not see how it is in my power to "do the opposite" if God foreordains my action. Perhaps you can provide a definition of "foreordain" which does in fact show that I have the ability to act against God's ordinances. However, if I am able to do so, then how are God's ordinances anything more than the ordinances of a human being? If someone deludes himself into think he has the power to foreordain the future and then starts making proclamations, then it's clear that his proclamations wont require anyone to do what he says. I can certainly act in a way which contradicts a crazy person's "foreordination." But presumably there is something more to God's foreordaining of future events. But what precisely is it? Even more, how can it be something stronger without violating my ability to do otherwise?
The fundamental problem is that compatibilism affirms determinism and free will, which seem contradictory. There is no "ability to do otherwise" if all of your actions are necessitated (whether by God's decrees or the laws of nature). Further, you are not free if your actions are caused, or if they take place through anything other than your own self-initiation, which cannot come about because of God's decisions. Otherwise, it is not self-initiation.
Re: Letter to a Calvinist
Thanks, Tim. Briefly, in response to each of your points.
1. You're right -- I did not mean to define a decree, but rather merely to explain my view of its implications in this particular context. I view a "decree" simply as a pronouncement. When a decree is issued by God, the decree is infallibly certain to occur, and hence a divine decree constitutes the strongest possible form of determinism. If I said anything that led you to believe I was referring to an indeterministic foreknowledge in my previous message, then it was inadvertent. That was not, and is not, my view, so I appreciate the opportunity to correct any such impression. Nonetheless, your original 5 was too strong, because the only consequence of a deterministic decree that X will happen is that X will, in fact, happen, not that the agent in question could not have done otherwise. The latter, stronger requirement -- which would have been necessary to support the contradiction you allege -- would have required that the decree operate by imposing an external coercion from outside the agent's decisionmaking processes rather than by simply deterministically effecting certain decisions to be made by virtue of those processes. The compatibilist claim is that an agent's decision is simply the result of the agent's own decisionmaking processes, whether those processes are themselves subject to ultimate deterministic outside causes. (Hence, I think it's important that I am, in fact, talking about decisionmaking processes, i.e., the ordinary cognitive mechanisms by which an organism elects to engage in one particular behavior rather than another, and not merely some more generalized faculty of "deliberation.")
2. My discussion cannot, as a matter of principle, beg any questions, because I am simply arguing defensively that no contradiction has yet been established. I have not so far been arguing for compatibilism, but rather merely arguing that nobody has offered a definitive disproof of that view. Given that posture, it is perfectly permissible for me to, as you put it, "assume that compatibilism is consistent with free will, rather than to show it," because it is you who has offered an argument that purports to disprove that claim. In arguing that no such disproof has been made, I am perfectly entitled to assume the compatibilist view and argue the inadequacy of your contrary demonstration.
I appreciate the discussion. Gosh, I can't stand it when these sorts of things become heated, which for some reason I don't understand seems to be a particular problem when it comes to Reformed versus non-Reformed theology, so I'm glad this discussion is so cordial.
CThomas
1. You're right -- I did not mean to define a decree, but rather merely to explain my view of its implications in this particular context. I view a "decree" simply as a pronouncement. When a decree is issued by God, the decree is infallibly certain to occur, and hence a divine decree constitutes the strongest possible form of determinism. If I said anything that led you to believe I was referring to an indeterministic foreknowledge in my previous message, then it was inadvertent. That was not, and is not, my view, so I appreciate the opportunity to correct any such impression. Nonetheless, your original 5 was too strong, because the only consequence of a deterministic decree that X will happen is that X will, in fact, happen, not that the agent in question could not have done otherwise. The latter, stronger requirement -- which would have been necessary to support the contradiction you allege -- would have required that the decree operate by imposing an external coercion from outside the agent's decisionmaking processes rather than by simply deterministically effecting certain decisions to be made by virtue of those processes. The compatibilist claim is that an agent's decision is simply the result of the agent's own decisionmaking processes, whether those processes are themselves subject to ultimate deterministic outside causes. (Hence, I think it's important that I am, in fact, talking about decisionmaking processes, i.e., the ordinary cognitive mechanisms by which an organism elects to engage in one particular behavior rather than another, and not merely some more generalized faculty of "deliberation.")
2. My discussion cannot, as a matter of principle, beg any questions, because I am simply arguing defensively that no contradiction has yet been established. I have not so far been arguing for compatibilism, but rather merely arguing that nobody has offered a definitive disproof of that view. Given that posture, it is perfectly permissible for me to, as you put it, "assume that compatibilism is consistent with free will, rather than to show it," because it is you who has offered an argument that purports to disprove that claim. In arguing that no such disproof has been made, I am perfectly entitled to assume the compatibilist view and argue the inadequacy of your contrary demonstration.
I appreciate the discussion. Gosh, I can't stand it when these sorts of things become heated, which for some reason I don't understand seems to be a particular problem when it comes to Reformed versus non-Reformed theology, so I'm glad this discussion is so cordial.
CThomas
Re: Letter to a Calvinist
CThomas,
I really don't understand how the reformed compatibilist view is any more helpful in achieving its goals than a "hard" deterministic view. All it does is places the emphasis on a different link in the chain of decision-making events. It claims that the human choice is freely made but that the volition/will/desire, which always forces us to choose in a specific way, is determined by God.
If in fact God determines the volition/will/desire of every human forcing that human to choose 100% of the time in accordance with that determined volition/will/desire, then in reality there is no free choice. There is just the perception of free choice, which is based on ignorance. (In fact, it seems a bit cruel to design things in such a way that people are led to believe they are freely choosing when in fact their choices are determined by the prior link in the chain.)
If I had to choose between the two views, I'd choose "hard" determinism over "soft" determinism because it produces the exact same results without the smoke and mirrors.
I really don't understand how the reformed compatibilist view is any more helpful in achieving its goals than a "hard" deterministic view. All it does is places the emphasis on a different link in the chain of decision-making events. It claims that the human choice is freely made but that the volition/will/desire, which always forces us to choose in a specific way, is determined by God.
If in fact God determines the volition/will/desire of every human forcing that human to choose 100% of the time in accordance with that determined volition/will/desire, then in reality there is no free choice. There is just the perception of free choice, which is based on ignorance. (In fact, it seems a bit cruel to design things in such a way that people are led to believe they are freely choosing when in fact their choices are determined by the prior link in the chain.)
If I had to choose between the two views, I'd choose "hard" determinism over "soft" determinism because it produces the exact same results without the smoke and mirrors.
Let me boldly state the obvious. If you are not sure whether you heard directly from God, you didn’t.
~Garry Friesen
~Garry Friesen
Re: Letter to a Calvinist
Hi, Psimmond. What is the "hard determinist" view that you find preferable? That God always determines human choices through external coercion and not through the decisional processes of the individual? This is just demonstrably false and I've never heard of any Calvinist who believed it. All you need to do is look around and you'll see people every day making various decisions about things. I just decided to go eat a cookie. If God determined that choice, then He did so by causing me to make the choice through my ordinary volitional processes. Or else He did not determine it at all. I don't think there is a viable third "harder" option there.
CThomas
CThomas
Re: Letter to a Calvinist
Hi CThomas,
The incompatibilist view known as "hard" determinism has no problem stating that humans lack the ability to freely choose. They say that God's sovereignty necessitates his control over everything we think, say, and do. According to this view, free will is nothing more than a false perception; all things are foreordained and determined by God.
Like incompatibilists, compatibilists say that we lack libertarian freedom; however, compatibilists say we are able to freely choose. If I ponder what I want to be--a human, an elephant, a wildcat--and then after deliberation freely choose to be human, did I really make a free choice? Did I even make a choice? Those in the "hard" determinism camp would say that no choice was in fact made since there were no possible alternatives. And I would agree.
I don't like this "hard" determinism view; however, I find it preferable to compatibilism/soft determinism because I find compatibilist's claim that humans have the ability to freely choose doesn't stand up under close scrutiny.
So, although I disagree with both views, I have greater respect for the less popular "hard" determinism view since it doesn't offer something that it can't deliver.
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Sorry, I edited it for clarity without realizing there was a response to it...
The incompatibilist view known as "hard" determinism has no problem stating that humans lack the ability to freely choose. They say that God's sovereignty necessitates his control over everything we think, say, and do. According to this view, free will is nothing more than a false perception; all things are foreordained and determined by God.
Like incompatibilists, compatibilists say that we lack libertarian freedom; however, compatibilists say we are able to freely choose. If I ponder what I want to be--a human, an elephant, a wildcat--and then after deliberation freely choose to be human, did I really make a free choice? Did I even make a choice? Those in the "hard" determinism camp would say that no choice was in fact made since there were no possible alternatives. And I would agree.
I don't like this "hard" determinism view; however, I find it preferable to compatibilism/soft determinism because I find compatibilist's claim that humans have the ability to freely choose doesn't stand up under close scrutiny.
So, although I disagree with both views, I have greater respect for the less popular "hard" determinism view since it doesn't offer something that it can't deliver.
__________________________
Sorry, I edited it for clarity without realizing there was a response to it...
Last edited by psimmond on Sun Jun 02, 2013 7:54 am, edited 2 times in total.
Let me boldly state the obvious. If you are not sure whether you heard directly from God, you didn’t.
~Garry Friesen
~Garry Friesen
Re: Letter to a Calvinist
Thanks, I see what you're saying now. That's fair enough, but of course it is predicated on your prior belief that compatibilism doesn't work. Obviously if I thought it didn't work I would reject it too.
CThomas
CThomas