Open Theism and Determinism

[Paidion]

I don't accept your reasoning.

There's nothing I can do about that.

You assume that God can not foresee a person freely choosing to do something.

No, that is not my assumption. That is my conclusion.

[mattrose]

Thanks, Paidion. The biggest problem is, even with such a reconstruction like this, Peter, if he had genuine free will, might have surprised everybody (including Jesus) and, just this once, showed sufficient courage to keep his convictions.

If there is no way Peter could possibly have done otherwise, then he was not free, and could not have been morally responsible for his denials. On the other hand, had he done otherwise, He would have made Jesus a false prophet.

I might speculate that the phrase 'three times' may have been an idiom meaning 'over and over'

Jesus knew the character of his disciples
Jesus knew he was going to be arrested that night
Jesus knew his disciples would deny him to save themselves
Jesus knew Peter's over-zealousness led him to say that he wouldn't deny Jesus
Jesus knew that this outward aggressiveness was actually a sign of inward weakness
Jesus knew, then, that Peter would deny Jesus 'over and over' that very night

I think the cock crow thing was just a way they measured time (trumpets used to change the Roman guard at 3am). Jesus was basically saying, before the changing of the guard, you'll deny me over and over.

The thing to keep in mind here, is it was a prediction/prophecy covering only a handful of hours. I think predictions/prophecies like that can be pretty specific.

But this is just speculative. I'm not even a fully-committed open theist.

[Singalphile]

Good points. I have been somewhat favorable to Open Theism. Notwithstanding the responses, Homer's original point has knocked me away from it a bit.

I also do not know why God could not foreknow that a person will freely choose something (not that I understand it). It's been written many times that if God knows that a person will do X tomorrow, then that person could not have refrained from doing X. That is not obviously true to me.

Anyway, no need to respond to me. I don't think about this issue much, and I can go back and look at other threads or resources if I ever care to.

[Homer]

Hi Paidion,

You wrote:

Then the LORD said to me in the days of Josiah the king, "Have you seen what faithless Israel did? she went up on every high hill and under every green tree, and she was a harlot there. I thought, ‘after she has done all these things she will return to me’; but she did not return, and her treacherous sister Judah saw it." (Jeremiah 3:6,7 NASB)

This is just one example of Yahweh thinking one thing would happen, and the opposite happened. Or even it is "I said" instead of "I thought", this doesn't alter the import. In that case, God said that one thing would happen (and God doesn't lie) but the opposite happened.

The Hebrew is literally "I said", thus an absolute factual prediction if it is taken literally. You excuse God from error by claiming God was only predicting an event, expressing His judgment based on probability. The non open theist, John Piper can say just as well:

Boyd's explanation is that God did not know how the people would in fact act. That is certainly one way to understand the text. Another way is to say that when God said, "She will return," or, "You will not turn from following me," he had in mind implicit conditions on his statements of expectation. For example, he may have meant: "She will return to me, if the ordinary human expectations under these conditions occur." In other words, "So many helpful influences toward repentance have been given that it would be fully expected that a human, acting reasonably, would turn to the Lord." Or in the case of verse 19, God may have meant, "She will return to me, by all appearances." In other words, all the outward factors have been put in place to make her turning to me eminently reasonable and humanly expected.

What we are saying is that one solution to this apparent mistake on God's part is to treat it the way most commentators treat God's prophecy over Nineveh: "Yet forty days and Nineveh will be overthrown" (Jonah 3:4). But Nineveh repented and was not overthrown. The solution here is that God implicitly intended the condition: "Nineveh will be overthrown, unless she repents." Similarly here in Jeremiah 3:7 and 19-20 God says, without explicit conditions, "She will return," and, "You will not turn from following me." Conceivably these predictions may be absolute and unqualified (and thus God be mistaken); or they may be conditional and implicitly qualified, as in Jonah and other places.

So both sides of the argument take a non-literal position, otherwise God was wrong in this case.

[Paidion]

It's been written many times that if God knows that a person will do X tomorrow, then that person could not have refrained from doing X. That is not obviously true to me.

The reason it is not obviously true to you, may be that you think we are saying that God's foreknowledge that a person will do X causes the person to do X. That is not the case.

The real reason is that the assumption that the future is settled NOW cannot be reconciled with libertarian free will. The two contradict each other.

People sometimes make statements about the future. But they are not "propositions" as in formal logic. Propositions are either true or false. They cannot be both true and false. Nor can they be neither true of false. In formal logic, this is called "the law of the excluded middle." For example the proposition: "The Bible is on the table" is either true or false. The Bible cannot be both on the table and not on the table. Nor it be neither on the table nor not on the table.

Here is a sentence which APPEARS to be a proposition about the future. "Sarah will eat a chocolate at 8 P.M. tomorrow night." In other words, this appears to be a proposition which is either true of false. We think there is no other possibility. Let's see what happens if we assume the sentence is NOW true. How then, when it is 8 P.M. tomorrow night can Sarah refrain from eating a chocolate? For if she chooses to refrain, this contradicts our assumption. However, if we assume the sentence if NOW false, then is it possible for Sarah to eat a chocolate at 8 P.M. tomorrow night? How can she? For if she did so, that too would contradict our assumption. So whether the sentence is now true or whether the sentence is now false, there is something that Sarah CANNOT DO. Thus she does not have the free will either to eat a chocolate at 8 P.M. tomorrow or refrain from eating a chocolate at that time.

But if God (or anyone else) KNOWS NOW (in the absolute sense of the word) that Sarah will eat that chocolate, then Sarah will eat that chocolate. When 8 P.M. rolls around she cannot refrain from eating the chocolate.

My conclusion is that sentences about the future are not propositions, and therefore have no truth value. They are NEITHER true not false NOW. The sentence "Sarah eats a chocolate as 8 P.M. tomorrow night" is not now true, and it is not now false. This sentence will BECOME true or false at 8 P.M. tomorrow night when Sarah makes her choice, either to eat, or not to eat.

The reason such sentences APPEAR to be propositions is that they are often stated in propositional form.

For example, someone might say, "The Montreal Canadians will win the hockey game." That sounds like a proposition which is either true or false. But what the speaker is REALLY saying is, "I predict that the Montreal Canadians will win the hockey game." This, of course, IS a proposition, a proposition that is likely to be true (if the speaker is, indeed making a prediction). It's NOT a guess; it is a PREDICTION based on what he knows about the abilities of the Montreal Canadians, and their successes in the past.

Another example. Someone might say, "I am going to the city tomorrow." This sentence is also in propositional form. But the speaker is actually saying, "I intend to go to the city tomorrow." The latter is a true proposition, if this is the speaker's intention.

Now God knows EVERYTHING there is to know. So His predictions which He expresses through His prophets usually turn out be be reality. On the other hand, when WE make predictions based on our incomplete knowledge, they often fail to actualize. However, because of free will agents which are able to choose freely, sometimes even God's predictions did not become reality.

God predicted that after Israel had done many evil things, she would return to Him, but she didn't return.

And I thought, ‘After she has done all this she will return to me,’ but she did not return... (Jeremiah 3:7 RSV, ESV, NASB)
(The Jewish Study Bible translated by experts in Hebrew renders the sentence the same except that it has "said" instead of "thought".)

God also made statements of intention, which, being omnipotent, He had the power to carry out, but He sometimes changed His mind in response to human decisions:

If at any time I declare concerning a nation or a kingdom, that I will pluck up and break down and destroy it, and if that nation, concerning which I have spoken, turns from its evil, I will repent of the evil that I intended to do to it. And if at any time I declare concerning a nation or a kingdom that I will build and plant it, and if it does evil in my sight, not listening to my voice, then I will repent of the good which I had intended to do to it. (Jeremiah 18:7-10)

Now if God had known in advance in the first instance that the nation would turn from its evil, why would He have declared that He would destroy it? Did He declare this in order to induce it to repent? I don't think so, for this would be a lie if He had known all along that they WOULD REPENT, and that He hadn't planned to destroy it at all.




So when Jesus said to Peter, "You will deny me", He was making a prediction,

[mattrose]

For my part, I do not lean open theist b/c 'classic arminianism cannot make sense.'

I lean open theist b/c I have come across no convincing argument that the future exists.

[Paidion]

I fail to see the difference, Matt.

Proponents of classic Arminianism affirm that God looks into the future and can therefore make infallible statements about future events.

If the future doesn't exist, then there is no future into which God can look.

[Paidion]

The solution here is that God implicitly intended the condition: "Nineveh will be overthrown, unless she repents."

If that is what God intended, why didn't He say it that way? Jonah certainly didn't understand it that way. Jonah preached what appeared to be an unconditional prophecy:

Jonah began to go into the city, going a day’s journey. and he cried, "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown!" (Jonah 3:4)

Then we read:

When God saw what they did, how they turned from their evil way, God repented of the evil which he had said he would do to them; and he did not do it. (Jonah 3:10)

God "repented" (changed His mind) about what He said He would do to the Ninevites. There would be no change of mind on God's part, if He had intended to spare them on the condition that they change their ways.

Furthermore Jonah didn't understand God's message as conditional. For he sat outside the city to watch what God would do to the city.

[mattrose]

I fail to see the difference, Matt.

Proponents of classic Arminianism affirm that God looks into the future and can therefore make infallible statements about future events.

If the future doesn't exist, then there is no future into which God can look.

What I meant is... I don't think it is hopeless to reconcile the concept of free will with the concept of exhaustive foreknowledge. I, myself, have not found a satisfactory solution.... but I won't insist that it would be impossible to find one.

So my reason for leaning toward open theism isn't primarily that I reject the possibility of maintaining the concept of free will in the classical arminian system. My main reason for leaning open theist is not negative argument (against classic arminianism), but positive claim (the future doesn't exist). Perhaps it's too subtle a nuance, but I feel there is a difference in motivation there.

[Homer]

Hi Paidion,

Here is a sentence which APPEARS to be a proposition about the future. "Sarah will eat a chocolate at 8 P.M. tomorrow night." In other words, this appears to be a proposition which is either true of false.

Let us modify the sentence:

Sarah will freely choose to eat a chocolate at 8 P.M. tomorrow night.

If Open Theism is true then God must be almost totally ignorant about the future. There are billions of people all each making many decisions every day that God can not foresee. Seems He is continually being caught off guard in a great number of ways.