Chapter 5
Reason and Hell
The result of our survey of key Scriptural passages presents us with the problem of ambiguity. This is not to say that the three views discussed above are on equal Scriptural footing, but it is to say that there is room for different people to come to different conclusions as to which of the views is built on the most solid Scriptural ground. What seems clear is that Hell is a reality, but we are left with an apparently conflicting set of options regarding its nature.
This is precisely the point where other factors (reason, tradition & experience) come into play. It is not that once we establish Scripture as somewhat ambiguous we can set it aside and allow reason, tradition, and/or experience to settle the matter. Instead, we allow them to help us better understand Scripture. We use our God given minds to test the soundness of each view, while humbly remembering that our minds have been corrupted by sin. We must acknowledge that our use of reason is not flawless while avoiding the sin of not using our reason at all.
A number of issues concerning Hell lend themselves to reasonable discussion. Jerry Walls, in his book Hell: The Logic of Damnation, attempts to defend the everlasting misery perspective on Hell in light of our knowledge of human belief, divine foreknowledge, divine power, divine goodness, human freedom, and human misery respectively. Charles Seymour, with the same goal in mind, narrows the discussion to matters of justice, love, and freedom. On the other end of the spectrum is Thomas Talbott. In section three of his book defending eventual restoration, he discusses how issues such as exclusivism, justice, omnipotence, freedom, and love relate to the concept of Hell. Given the nature of our project, we cannot attempt to cover all of these issues adequately. We will focus on the issues that seem to be brought to the table most often in this debate: justice, freedom, and love. Our initial goal will be to observe how these three perspectives of Hell respond to these important matters. Subsequently, we will offer some evaluation of how the three perspectives fare under the rubric of reason.
HELL AND DIVINE JUSTICE
Any doctrine of Hell must deal with the question of justice. Hell, by any of the definitions we are considering, is a serious consequence of dying with a yet broken relationship with God. But is it a just consequence? The Bible speaks of justice ultimately reigning supreme in God’s creation. Ultimately, the penalty for sin will fit the crime. In light of this, which of the three views is in accord to what we know of God’s justice? It is important to keep in mind, during this discussion, that justice is not a separate compartment of God’s character. God is not schizophrenic. God’s justice is an aspect of His love. Love seeks justice.
The everlasting misery view must respond to the charge that everlasting misery is a punishment that does not fit the crime. One advocate of eventual extinction, John Wenham, confesses that, “Whatever anyone says, unending torment speaks to me of sadism, not justice.” It is a typical critique of this view that everlasting or eternal misery goes far beyond what is deserved by finite creatures for their finite sins. It is argued that even the worst of sinners would not deserve to experience Hell forever. John Stott wonders if the doctrine of everlasting misery creates “a serious imbalance between sins consciously committed in time and torment consciously experienced throughout eternity.” Some consider this the most significant problem that the everlasting misery view faces. Can God be morally justified for sentencing people to this kind of punishment?
In response, advocates of the everlasting misery perspective resort to two key principles. The first principle is that they understand that the punishment of Hell is clearly depicted in Scripture as retributive in nature. We will be judged according to our works. Accordingly, Hell is not intended to be remedial. It is a pouring out of God’s wrath due to his hatred of sin, not his discipline due to his love of the sinner. The retributive principle is coupled with the principle of status. “The idea behind this principle is that guilt is not merely relative to the offense, but also to the status of the offended party.” The logic is clear. Human sin is rebellion against God. God is eternal and infinite. Punishment for sin, therefore, must be eternal and infinite as well. If these two principles are sound, then it would seem to follow that the everlasting misery perspective on Hell passes the test of reason. Indeed, advocates of the everlasting misery position see the rejection of these principles as the problem. Walvoord is typical in stating that, “the problem here is the obvious lack of understanding of the infinite nature of sin as contrasted to the infinite righteousness of God. If the slightest sin is infinite in its significance, then it also demands infinite punishment as a divine judgment.”
The everlasting misery position, then, typically suggests that for the punishment (Hell) to fit the crime (sin against an infinite God), the nature of Hell must be infinitely miserable in both quality and quantity (everlasting misery). This is an argument from reason, but is it reasonable? It is unlikely that advocates of any of the three positions would take much issue with the claim that human sin is against God or that God is infinite by nature. But why must we relate human punishment to God’s infinite nature? “We normally do not measure guilt according to the status of the offended party.” Solid argumentation for this principle appears to be lacking.
If the principle of status is faulty, the principle of retribution ceases to support the doctrine of everlasting misery and actually begins to torment it. We must remember that the retributive principle “was never instituted for the purpose of justifying harsh punishment for serious crimes, something that no one at the time would have questioned; instead, it was instituted for the purpose of eliminating excessive punishment, such as capital punishment in exchange for a tooth.” It would seem that the only way that God could be justified in sentencing someone to everlasting misery, short of insisting on the aforementioned status principle, is if that person inflicted everlasting misery on someone else. But what human has the power to do that? Marilyn Adams concludes, “The ‘an eye for an eye’ principle might justify God in visiting some punishment on some people after death. But given the finite length of human life and the finite extent of human power to cause suffering, it could not by itself justify God in making someone totally unhappy forever.”
John Stott suggests that the only way out of this apparent trap for the everlasting misery doctrine is to suggest that sinners in Hell continue to sin forever. Interestingly, this is exactly the tract that two contemporary philosophical defenders of the everlasting misery doctrine have taken. Charles Seymour insists that everlasting misery may be considered just if the damned continue to sin, and he supposes that they do. Likewise, Jerry Walls suggests that the damned are continually stubborn and attempts to show why they may willfully choose to remain in Hell. It is worth noting though, that both of these authors, even while attempting to defend everlasting misery, leave room for the possibility of eventual extinction and eventual restoration on an individual level. Thus, in defending the justice of the everlasting misery perspective, they felt the need to first surrender its classical lines of defense and then abandon its absoluteness.
The eventual extinction perspective is confronted with an interesting pair of critiques when it comes to justice issues. On one hand, the view may be accused of not satisfying the demand for justice by letting sinners off the hook too easily. Peterson pleads for evangelicals to reject the eventual extinction view “because it leads unrepentant sinners to underestimate their fate” before adding that “it is simply not that bad to cease to exist.” This criticism seems more legitimate, however, when it is leveled against those who promote instant extinction rather than eventual extinction. Peterson certainly cannot be suggesting that even a short time in Hell would not be that bad.
On the other hand, it may be argued that the eventual extinction doctrine is too harsh. Charles Seymour suggests that since extinction is an infinite consequence, it falls under the same critique as did the everlasting misery doctrine. Why should human beings eventually be sentenced to everlasting extinction for temporal sins? But this critique is softened when we consider that most adherents to the eventual extinction view also believe that our immortality is conditional to begin with. In other words, life itself is a gift from God. If God allows our life to fade away, that is not so much a punishment as a consequence of sin. In any case, the extinct would hardly feel slighted.
Non-Christian universalism could easily be accused of not taking justice seriously. What would we think of a God that gave sin and wickedness a free pass? But what we have labeled eventual restoration is less prone to this critique insofar as it posits an actual stay in Hell, though of limited duration, followed by repentance and faith in Christ. As one defender of this view puts it, the eventual restoration position “must have an important place for divine punishment. What makes us universalists is not that we have unusually weak views of sin but unusually strong views of divine love and grace.”
In regards to justice, it is not surprising that the everlasting misery view faces the strongest critique. Few question that sin deserves death and, perhaps, some duration of punishment, but everlasting punishment? It is the view of Hell that is most easily the target of questions about the fairness of Hell. There are, however, possible answers to such questions. As discussed above, if the wicked continue to sin, the justice of everlasting misery becomes more plausible. This defense also assumes that the occupants of Hell freely choose continued separation from God. Everlasting misery has usually been considered more defensible when it is emphasized that God doesn’t desire for anyone to be in such a state, but that people choose it.
HELL AND HUMAN FREEDOM
Another issue that must be considered when discussing the reasonableness of the various perspectives on Hell is that of human freedom. We’ve already seen that the most philosophically defensible account of everlasting misery insists on the ongoing freedom of the wicked. It is this same freedom that the eventual restoration view normally depends upon. Nevertheless, some have questioned whether an insistence that all will eventually be restored to God is even compatible with this supposed freedom.
Thomas Talbott has argued that the idea that someone might freely choose everlasting misery is absurd. The supposed absurdity comes from two key points. First, Talbott believes that for someone to make an ultimately free decision, they must be fully informed about said decision. Once one is informed about God’s nature and the nature of Hell, how could they choose everlasting misery? Second, Talbott argues that “the very idea of someone freely rejecting God forever is deeply incoherent and therefore logically impossible.” How could someone rationally choose everlasting misery? They would have to be in an irrational state of mind and, thus, not genuinely free.
Though the above points from Talbott may sound somewhat similar at first glance, it is important to respond to them separately. In regards to the first point, Jerry Walls suggests that true freedom requires a limit on the degree of pressure before it is better labeled coercion. Therefore, in his view, “it is arguable that the evidence needs to be at least adequate for belief to be rational, but short of compelling, for us to be properly free in our response to it.” In other words, Walls questions Talbott’s assumption that the wicked will be fully informed in Hell. If they were fully informed, they may not be truly free. Walls believes that Talbott has failed to account for the progressive nature of revelation. We don’t simply become fully informed about God all at once. We learn to know God in a relationship of trust and love. If one refuses such a relationship, they may never come to a fully informed view of the facts of life. The nature of relationship insists that those who have not responded positively to grace are not yet as informed as they could be.
Walls also responds to Talbott’s insistence that freedom necessarily requires rationality. While admitting that identifying even an irrational motive toward everlasting misery is one of the most difficult problems faced by his camp, Walls claims the evil may indeed be chosen decisively. He agrees with Talbott that anyone making such a decision would be behaving irrationally and would be presenting solid evidence that they are profoundly deceived, but this may be a self-inflicted wound. Walls concludes, “it seems to me that the ability to deceive ourselves may be an essential component of moral freedom.”
Even if we grant Talbott’s points that once fully informed the wicked will rationally repent and choose salvation, other serious issues are raised by this scenario. As Walls states, “there are serious problems with [Talbott’s] claim that persons who repent under forcibly imposed punishment are free in the libertarian sense.” Finally choosing to repent under the pressure of Hell may be closer to coercion than genuine choice.
It is difficult to determine where the strength lies in this debate, but it seems that Walls offers not only some solid critique of Talbott’s claim that it is incoherent to imagine people choosing everlasting misery, but also some plausible thoughts on how such a choice could be made. It will serve us well to remember that Walls is not defending the position that all the wicked will choose everlasting misery (he believes, in fact, that it is implausible that all the wicked would choose to remain in Hell). It would be extremely difficult, philosophically, to argue that the wicked are genuinely free in Hell and yet not one will choose to repent. Walls believes that some of the wicked will, indeed, repent and be restored. It is Talbott who is taking the strong view here, insisting that every individual will ultimately make the choice to be restored to God. He doesn’t simply suggest it is possible, but claims it is what will indeed happen. The passion of this insistence on ultimate universal salvation is perhaps best demonstrated by his claim that, even if somehow someone could make the choice of everlasting misery, “a perfectly loving God would never grant his loved ones the freedom to make it.” In the end, then, Talbott is even willing to argue that human freedom will be removed to ensure universal reconciliation. One is left wondering if that sort of reconciliation is genuine and if Talbott is driven, here, by reason or by desire.
Thus far, we have not discussed the eventual extinction position in regards to human freedom. The reason for this is fairly obvious. The everlasting misery position must either claim that the wicked in Hell no longer have freedom (the classical version) or could plausibly use their freedom to choose Hell (the contemporary version). We have seen that the classical version of the everlasting misery view is extremely difficult to defend on philosophical grounds. The more contemporary version, though it still faces difficulties, may offer a plausible defense of how such a choice is possible, but in doing so it seemingly must allow for the possibility that some of the wicked may repent and be restored. The eventual restoration position insists that all the wicked will either make the choice to be redeemed or eventually have the choice made for them. In any case, matters of human freedom are at the heart of both of these positions in a way that does not obviously relate to the eventual extinction view since it alone cuts off human freedom before it becomes too overwhelming of an issue. Indeed, Walls believes this is less an exemption from the current debate and more an argument against the eventual extinction position. He argues that this cutting off of life “would detract from the seriousness of moral freedom.”
It seems that contemporary accounts of everlasting misery have adjusted to better handle critique in the area of human freedom. Indeed, it appears to be the case that the eventual restoration position has the most work to do in this area. Just as the everlasting misery position adjusted to allow for some possibility of mobility between Hell and Heaven, the eventual restoration advocates may have to adjust to a less certain position. If, “a strong doctrine of universalism seems to preempt the possibility of a creature’s persistent refusal to be transformed by the glory of God, the God-given possibility of saying no,” then perhaps a less certain and more hopeful version is to be preferred. At best, advocates may argue that the vast majority of the wicked will repent in Hell, but they cannot guarantee the future choices of free agents.
HELL AND LOVE
Each of the three views of Hell must respond to a different critique so far as it concerns the love of God. May a God who creates/allows a system of everlasting misery truly be called a loving God? How does Hell fit with God’s own command of enemy love? Is causing/allowing the extinction of the wicked, as in the eventual extinction position, a loving response to their free choices? Does a passion for love, or a deep understanding of love’s power fuel the eventual restoration position?
Our first view, everlasting misery, faces an initial struggle in the area of love. The concept of an angry God holding his enemies to the fire seems philosophically indefensible. But even the more contemporary defense that God allows them to continue miserably as a loving recognition of the dignity of human existence, is suspect. Jesus revealed and commanded God’s enemy love. Such a revelation is, indeed, difficult to reconcile with the doctrine that sees God as even allowing the unending misery of much of his creation. If such an apparent contradiction is merely apparent, resolution will be found only because we so adamantly believe everlasting misery is taught in Scripture that we persist in suggesting possible explanations. A fully satisfying explanation seems yet to have been given.
Our second view, eventual extinction, also falls prey to critique here. Charles Seymour has suggested that “to love something is to help it be what it is meant to be or to desire its good.” He then critiques the eventual extinction viewpoint by asking, “Should God annihilate these souls? This would not be a loving response, since annihilation is the absolute removal of being. Love desires the goodness of the thing loved, but since goodness and being are identical, annihilation would be unloving. So God preserves the wicked in being and allows them to express as much of their nature as possible.”
This critique, however, falls short for two reasons. First, it seems unclear on the subject of immortality. Are people naturally immortal or not? The beginning of the quote makes it sound as if naturally immortal people could be, but would not be, annihilated by God. The end of the quote, however, sounds as if immortality is conditional, but that God will choose to preserve and otherwise fading people in order to allow them to express themselves. Second, Seymour surprisingly (given his position) seems to be assuming that love always wins out in the end. Even if his definition is correct that to love something is to desire its good, this does not dictate that God’s desires always come to fruition. What’s more, it could be suggested that extinction would be better than misery and therefore the more loving thing for God to do in response to ongoing rebellion.
Our third view, eventual restoration, would seem to be on its home turf when considering how love relates to Hell. Talbott’s book, foundational to this perspective, is titled The Inescapable Love of God. His argument is largely a logical one. If God wants all people to be saved, and God is powerful enough to achieve his purposes, then all people will eventually be saved. Supporters of the eventual restoration position claim that not only does God’s love logically win, but that if it somehow did not God would come out, unthinkably, a loser.
As to Talbott’s logic, few Arminians would question the validity of the idea that God wants all people to be saved. Nor would they deny that God is powerful enough to achieve his purposes. Even still, the concluding point (that all will eventually be restored) may be avoided by adding nuance to each of the two premises. Surely God wants all people to be saved and is powerful enough to do whatever he wants, but to save people (and not mere machines) they must freely choose to be restored to God. In other words, God voluntarily limits himself, choosing not to overpower the objects of his love. Such a strategy makes genuine relationship between God and people possible.
The second argument (that if everyone isn’t eventually restored, God doesn’t win) seems more difficult to overcome. In what sense is God victorious if (as is usually figured) most human beings end up as miserable rebels? Wouldn’t Satan be the winner in such a scenario, to some extent? Nor does the eventual extinction position escape the clutches of this argument. Talbott insists, “even the annihilation of the wicked would represent a permanent defeat for a loving God and would leave a permanent stain on his creation.” If the eventual restoration position is true, God is victorious over all of creation, but only because many members of that creation no longer exist. If the everlasting misery position is true, God is victorious over all of creation only in the sense that all of creation is subjected to his authority, even if many or most of the members of creation are bitter about that fact. Advocates of eventual restoration suggest both of these scenarios sound less like victory and more like defeat.
In the end, however, the answer to this point may come back to the previous paragraph. As C.S. Lewis puts it, “it is objected that the ultimate loss of s single soul means the defeat of omnipotence. And so it does. In creating beings with free will, omnipotence from the outset submits to the possibility of such defeat. What you call defeat, I call miracle: for to make things which are not Itself, and thus to become, in a sense, capable of being resisted by its own handiwork, is the most astonishing and unimaginable of all the feats we attribute to the Deity.”
Again, it appears the eventual restoration position has the philosophical high ground in regards to how love may relate to Hell. The philosophical strength of the eventual restoration position should not be surprising, especially considering many who dispute the view accuse it of being wholly driven by philosophy.
There is another aspect of this debate that must be discussed. As we analyzed the views in light of issues of justice, freedom, and love, it was probably apparent that the eventual extinction view largely stayed out of the scrum. Far more space was given to the other two views. The reason for this, as mentioned previously, is because the problems that confront the other two views are somewhat mitigated by the limited duration of the eventual extinction position.
There is an issue, however, that specifically pertains to the eventual extinction position and is a matter of reason/philosophy. That is, of course, the issue of whether people are inherently or conditionally immortal. Surely, the issue matters to all three positions. For instance, there is debate within the everlasting misery camp as to this question. There is a sizeable moral difference between God allowing the wicked to experience Hell forever because they, by nature, will live forever versus God actively keeping people alive so that they will experience everlasting misery. The second position seems morally repulsive. Nevertheless, some advocates of the everlasting misery perspective argue this very thing. Christopher Morgan, for instance, sides with the conditionalists on the issue. He states, “There is no disagreement on these things between the conditionalists and those holding the historic view of Hell [everlasting misery]. The real issue is whether God grants endless existence to unbelievers for the purpose of punishing them or whether he punishes them into non-existence.” And yet he insists that, “the wicked will be punished consciously forever in Hell, not because they exist as immortal souls but because God will sustain them.” Taking such a position only makes the matters discussed above more difficult for the everlasting misery perspective.
In any case, we must briefly examine this issue of inherent versus conditional immortality. It is important (though not necessarily crucial) to the eventual extinction position that human beings are not inherently immortal. As we noted in the Scripture section, the Bible seems to support the position that God alone is immortal, but how does human reason come into play in this debate?
It is a frustrating reality in the literature on Hell that this point (inherent immortality) is more often assumed than argued. Note a series of quotes from one popular apologetics handbook in discussing Hell: “Souls seem to be intrinsically immortal, immortal by their essence, so that it would be as self-contradictory to have a soul cease to exist as to have a circle become a square.” “To annihilate the souls in Hell would be to destroy something God created to be intrinsically and essentially immortal and indestructible- this is another self-contradiction.” Finally, “God does not sustain in existence the souls of the damned by any supernaturally willed act. Rather, his sustaining of souls forever is built into the nature of souls. In the act of creating eternal souls in the first place, God sustains them forever.” Surely such a position is morally preferable to that of Morgan (above), but the point is that no further arguments are made as to support what seems to be true to the author. In essence, then, conditionalism (and largely the entire eventual extinction position) is tossed aside before debate begins.
How did such strong assumptions about the inherent immortality of the soul come about? Conditionalists argue that the notion of the immortality of the soul was brought into Christianity from Greek philosophy. Early Christians, eager to show their neighbors the reasonableness of their faith, “freely borrowed the Platonic conception of the soul.” Certainly the Fathers adapted Plato’s notions in important ways, but they brought the basic idea of the soul’s immortality into Christianity from the outside.
Of course, the extent of influence that Greek philosophy had on the early church father’s views about the immortality of the soul is debatable. While all are willing to recognize some influence, defenders of everlasting misery (and eventual restoration, for that matter) often argue that immortality is an irrevocable gift given to all humans in that they are made in the image of God. Thus, it is not that people are immortal apart from God, but that all people are immortal because of God. In any case, what one thinks in regards to the debate between inherent and conditional immortality will probably play a role in determining their interest in the eventual extinction perspective. Someone who tends toward conditionalism is more likely to consider the eventual extinction position over and against the everlasting misery view because the idea of God keeping someone alive so that they will experience misery is difficult to fathom. Someone convinced that immortality is unconditional for humanity would seemingly have to choose between everlasting misery and eventual restoration (or for God to override, somehow, their inherent immortality). Thus, while “the annihilation theory resonates well with the modern acknowledgement of human finitude, in contrast to the Hellenist doctrine of an eternal soul,” every interpreter must make his or her own decision on this issue.
Chapter 6
Tradition and Hell
Tradition and Hell
We have seen that Scripture provides us with some ambiguity about Hell. This has created an environment for differing views to emerge in Christendom. Human reason provides us with a means to consider the strengths and weaknesses of these views, but by no means brings total clarity. Tradition and experience offer additional ways by which to evaluate various claims about the nature of Hell. Though Wesley gave tradition and experience a more restricted epistemological role than Scripture and reason, they still play an important part in helping us come to the truth.
Christians are part of a community and that community extends not only geographically across the planet, but also chronologically into the past. What past Christians have believed and said about Hell should matter to modern day believers. Wesley was a student of church history and his spiritual descendants ought to be as well. If one perspective on Hell has experienced nearly universal acceptance from Christians across the centuries of church history, this would seem to say a lot about the merits of that view. Indeed, Christians should be quite reluctant to depart from any overwhelming concensus regarding doctrinal matters.
Below, we will examine how these three views faired in church history. Our investigation will divide church history into three sections. The first section will cover the time period from the death of the Apostles until the rise of Augustine (this period will be referred to as the early church). The second section will span from Augustine to the Reformation (this period will be referred to as the medieval church). The third section will cover from the Reformation to the present (this period will be referred to as the post-reformation church). It is not the nature of this paper to thoroughly analyze the key players or statements in church history on the subject of Hell. Our aim is simply to discover what views have been present and to what extent they have been advocated in the different periods.
Hell in the Early Church
While aware of problems in the early church, Wesley gave preference to Christian writers from this period of church history for three key reasons: “their proximity to Biblical times, their eminent character, and a special endowment of the Holy Spirit upon them.” Wesley was highly suspicious of doctrines that could not be traced to the early church. On the other hand, Wesley was sometimes more gracious toward those from this period who have since been labeled unorthodox, emphasizing devout character over secondary doctrinal beliefs.
Even if we only had record of one view of Hell being advocated by the early church, it would not prove that only one view was present. Our knowledge of the early church comes from a limited amount of surviving material. What’s more, advocates of the view that wins out in the end sometimes control the material that survives. It is perhaps surprising, then, that we have surviving material from this period in support of all three views. Indeed, the views under consideration were all supported by notable characters from the period in question.
The everlasting misery perspective seems to have enjoyed broad support in the early church. Notably, Tertullian, Jerome, and Chrysostom held this view of Hell. Tertullian serves as one of the earliest known advocates of the everlasting misery position. Writing in the late 2nd and early 3rd century, he insisted on this view over and against the eventual extinction position. Commenting on Matthew 10:28, he states: “If, therefore, any one shall violently suppose that the destruction of the soul and the flesh in Hell amounts to a final annihilation of the two substances, and not to their penal treatment (as if they were to be consumed, not punished), let him recollect that the fire of Hell is eternal- expressly announced as an everlasting penalty.” Thus, for Tertullian, the word ‘destroy’ in the passage in question should be understood figuratively rather than literally. Given his belief in the immortality of the soul and the Scriptural statements about eternal punishment, the everlasting misery position must have seemed impossible to avoid.
The eventual extinction position seems to have been affirmed in the Didache and hints of it can be found in such notable men as Ignatius and Justin Martyr. Cautious language is necessary here because, in most cases, the surviving literature does not treat our subject systematically enough to firmly establish the position of the authors. Additionally, when the topic of Hell does come up, they often resort almost wholly to quoting Scripture which results in each camp claiming the author for their side. Justin, writing in the mid 2nd century, clearly identified belief in the immortality of the soul as a platonic notion. He believed that conscious punishment continues for the wicked only so long as God wills it, after which the wicked will cease to exist.
The eventual restoration view was very prominent in the early church. Indeed, John Wesley Hanson argued in the late 19th century that this view was the prevailing doctrine of the Christian church during its first five hundred years. He provides evidences from the catacombs, early Christian prayer habits, and Greek vocabulary to make his case, but the heart of his book focuses on notables such as Clement, Origin, and Gregory. Clement of Alexandria (late 2nd-Early 3rd century) insisted that God does not punish evil for punishments’ sake. Instead, God chastises for the good of those chastised (punishment is restorative in nature ). Origen, writing in the early 3rd century, builds on this insistance and is, perhaps, the most famous proponent of the eventual restoration view. It is important to note that while Origen was later considered a heretic by some, it was not Origen’s restorationist views that earned him this label. Hanson argues persuasively that mention of his eventual restoration position is notably absent from the earliest critiques of Origen. Gregory of Nyssa, writing in the 4th century, boldly stated that, “This is the end of our hope, that nothing shall be left contrary to the good, but that the divine life, penetrating all things, shall absolutely destroy death from existing things… For it is evident that God will in truth be in all when there shall be no more evil in existence.” Interestingly enough, when the Nicene Creed was perfected in A. D. 381, it was presided over by two Gregorys, both of whom were believers in the eventual restoration of all creation. This fact demonstrates to Hanson that eventual restoration was, at the very least, an accepted position amongst the orthodox in the earliest centuries of the church.
Clearly all three views were present in the early church, though the everlasting misery and eventual restoration positions can best evidence their prominence. During this period of church history, six theological schools developed. All three of the positions we are analyzing could claim at least one of these schools for their camp (the eventual restoration view may claim four of the six). Pinnock summarizes our findings well in saying, “There was no single Jewish view of Hell…There is a… diversity in the early Christian sources. The Apostles’ Creed affirms that Jesus will return to judge the living and the dead at the end of history, though it does not spell out the exact nature of that judgment. One can find the idea of everlasting torment, annihilation, and universalism.” It appears that the early church did not dogmatize on the fate of the wicked. Seymour suggests that “theological thinking seems to have been more flexible in the era before the magisterial influence of Augustine.”
Hell in the Medieval Church
It is no accident that what we are labeling the Medieval Church begins with Augustine. Few would argue that this man was one of the most influential Christians of all time when it comes to theology. He argued for the everlasting misery view of Hell and specifically against the alternative views. The power of his case dominated the dogmatic landscape for the next thousand years. He was the first to systematically defend the doctrine, “but after him this was, at least in the western church, the only valid doctrine.” The everlasting misery position reigned from Augustine onward and was subsequently defended by such notable names as Anselm and Acquinas.
Augustine of Hippo lived in the late 4th and early 5th centuries. In his day, disagreement amongst Christians about the nature of Hell was widespread. He himself notes the reality that many disagreed with his everlasting misery position: “Some, indeed very many, moan over the eternal punishment, and perpetual, unintermittent torments of the lost, and say they do not believe it shall so be.” While, rhetorically, Augustine speaks out strongly against opposing thoughts on Hell, he does not treat advocates of these other views as dangerous heretics. “They are good people, filled with compassion for their fellow human beings,” but they do so at the expense of the proper interpretation of Scripture.
Augustine argued strongly that the Scriptures were clear on the question of the nature of Hell. He dealt most extensively with the issue in Book 21 of City of God. He considered it “absurd… to interpret eternal punishment as meaning merely a fire of long duration while believing eternal life to signify life without end” since the phrases were parallel in texts such as Matthew 25:46. He insisted that the term in question had a single meaning in Scripture, namely, unending duration, though we should keep in mind that he admitted he was not knowledgeable in the Greek language in which the New Testament was written.
When the question arose as to how everlasting misery was a just punishment for temporal sins, Augustine appealed to the “complicity of all human beings in the universal sin of Adam.” Once we grasp the enormity of the first sin, everlasting misery becomes quite logical according to Augustine. But this response to the question of justice proved incomplete and demanded further elaboration by future defenders of Augustine’s view.
Anselm (late 11th to early 12th century) and Aquinas (13th century) came to Augustine’s aid, attempting to relieve the tension between God’s justice and the concept of everlasting misery. Working “within the framework of medieval feudal society,” Anselm argued that the degree of punishment should be set based not only on the crime, but also on the worthiness of the offended party. Since sin is against God and God’s worthiness is infinite, so must the resulting punishment be without end. Anselm was concerned to maintain a sense of beauty and balance in a creation that includes everlasting misery, and though his success is highly debatable, he felt that balancing sins against an infinitely worthy God with endless punishment was the means to this end.
Aquinas provided a slight variation, insisting the everlasting misery was just because a crime against an infinite being requires infinite punishment. It is worth noting that Aquinas and many other ancient defenders of the everlasting misery interpretation imagined that the wicked would be repentant in Hell, but that this repentance could not result in restoration because death was the finish line in terms of making a decision about Christ. Indeed, he suggests that “the blessed rejoice in seeing the damned punished” but “this joy is not a sign of corruption. Instead it shows a healthy respect for justice.” Together, Anselm and Aquinas “typify the main current of Western thought in the official midieval church. It was a theology cast in the mold of philosophy; tradition rather than exegesis filled in its details. As time passed, the tradition hardened and the distance from Scripture increased.”
The work of Augustine was so influential that both eventual extinction and eventual restoration were soon considered unorthodox and heretical. Anselm and Aquinas, along with Dante’s popular Divine Comedy assured that the concept of Hell was nearly synonymous with the idea of everlasting misery during this period. One author remarks, “it is perhaps not surprising that… unorthodox idea[s] appeared only in extremist and sectarian groups who rejected the authority of such ecclesiastical powers” during this era. Everlasting misery dominated the medieval church era and was assumed by the vast majority at the time of the Reformation.
Hell in the Post-Reformation Church
The Reformer’s inherited the medieval church’ s assumption of everlasting misery in Hell for the wicked. While there were some exceptions to the rule, almost all of the major players on record supported this now traditional view. The Reformer’s sought to weed out some of the dogma that had developed during the Medieval era, but they did this largely by going back to Augustinian theology and not so much by digging into the pre-Augustinian fathers. In many ways issues of eschatology were put on the backburner in the initial stages of the Reformation. Luther, Calvin, Edwards, Wesley, Whitefield, Shedd, and others are all on record supporting the doctrine of everlasting misery.
This inheritance, however, is more and more coming into dispute. While the doctrine of everlasting misery had been considered a core belief among many Evangelicals, the evidence indicates that this may no longer be the case. Dante brought the concept of everlasting misery into the popular imagination. Edwards pounded it from the pulpit. But sometime after Edwards Hell began to spiral into near oblivion. Much recent literature on the subject of Hell starts by indicating how little Hell is written about. Hell is only recently making it back to the table to be discussed. It appears the environment is ripe for fresh appraisal (as we’ve sought to do here).
While everlasting misery is still seemingly the position of the majority of Evangelicals, both the eventual extinction view and the eventual restoration view are gaining momentum in today’s theological climate. In addition, a number of prominent leaders have taken positions that seem to merge two or all three perspectives. Below we will catalogue some of the people at the forefront and the status of the contemporary discussion.
The everlasting misery view is probably still the majority position among Evangelicals, but it is significant that treatment of the subject is becoming less dogmatic. For example, the Evangelical Alliance Commission on Unity and Truth Among Evangelicals (ACUTE) recently treated everlasting misery and eventual extinction side by side. One of the conclusions reached by the group was stated as follows, “Evangelicals diverge on whether Hell is eternal in duration or effect.” Eventual restoration, on the other hand, was still rejected as incompatible with Evangelicalism. At least two prominent Evangelical publishers (Zondervan and IVP) have put out multiview books on Hell, allowing readers to hear various perspectives in friendly dialogue. What’s more, some of the defenses of everlasting misery are different from what has traditionally been held. We noted above that both Jerry Walls and Charles Seymour, in defending the everlasting misery view philosophically, altered it to include the possibilities of both some post-mortem extinction and even restoration. Of course, that is not to say the more traditional approach to everlasting misery is going away. Robert Peterson seems to be the most active defender of this view and treats both eventual extinction and eventual restoration as false witnesses.
The eventual extinction position has been gaining ground. That the ACUTE study treated it as a theological equal to everlasting misery is a significant reality. The view has been achored by Edward Fudge’s book The Fire that Consumes. Three editions have been published, each with a different prominent scholar writing the foreward (F.F. Bruce, John Wenham, and most recently Richard Bauckham). It is, perhaps, especially interesting that Bauckham wrote a foreward for Fudge considering he is often quoted in the everlasting misery literature as a supporter. Fudge, however, states directly that “Bauckham himself has rejected the traditional view of Hell as unending torment” and endorses eventual extinction. Certainly the support of respected Evangelicals such as John Stott and Clark Pinnock have helped build momentum. Fudge also lists notables like Homer Hailey, Michael Green, I. Howard Marshall, and Gregory Boyd as advocates of the eventual extinction position.
The emergence of an Evangelical form of universalism has proven more difficult. The leading Evangelical advocate of the eventual restoration position (Thomas Talbott) has had his Evangelical status questioned. Another Evangelical (Robin Parry) used a pseudonym to write his book The Evangelical Universalist. Popular author and speaker Rob Bell created a firestorm amongst Evangelicals by publishing Love Wins which raised questions about Hell and lent itself to the eventual restoration position. Clearly there is a reluctance from many to consider the merits of the eventual extinction position, but this reluctance is even greater when applied to eventual restoration.
Pinnock rightly summarizes where our study has taken us so far in the following quote,
“Tradition plays a major role in determining people’s thinking about Hell… Though scriptural support for Hell as eternal conscious suffering is weak and objections against it are strong, tradition is a formidable argument for holding the traditional view. I do not feel at all comfortable contradicting the likes of Saint Anselm and John Calvin.”
Chapter 7
Experience and Hell
Experience and Hell
What part may ‘experience’ play in an academic evaluation of the doctrine of the fate of the wicked? Ones mind might be initially drawn to some report of a human being claiming to have visited Hell and certainly such claims exist. Even if such a claim could be validated, however, it wouldn’t help build our case because any contemporary tour of ‘Hell’ would actually be a tour of the intermediate state. The focus of our research is on the final state. Instead, we will examine how our experiences may shed light on the nature of Hell by asking three practical questions. First, how do the three views of Hell that we have discussed resonate with the hearts of people (especially God’s people)? Second, how do the three views of Hell impact the mission of God’s people? Third, how do pastors handle the subject of Hell in their church’s and ministries?
Hell and Hearts
If we could select which of the three views of Hell was reality, what would we choose? Seemingly, Christians (enemy lovers at heart) would choose the eventual restoration position. Wouldn’t we be overjoyed to know that every single human being and all of creation would ultimately be restored to right relationship with God through Jesus Christ? If any professing Christian would admit to preferring that everlasting misery turn out to be true, one would have to wonder whether the love of God truly resides in their heart.
What, however, if the eventual restoration of every individual is too good to be true? Maybe some people will continually refuse to repent and be restored. In such a case, would we rather they faced everlasting misery or eventual extinction? It seems, given these two options, that extinction would be preferable to everlasting misery, though some question this conclusion. Indeed, Augustine objects, “mere existence is desirable… those who are wretched are for this very reason unwilling to die… they would certainly be overjoyed to choose perpetual misery in preference to complete annihilation.” This seems far from certain to many today. Eventual restoration is preferable to eventual extinction. Eventual extinction is preferable to everlasting misery.
Should we make something of our objection to everlasting misery? Is it significant that in our hearts we tend to detest the idea of Hell in general, but especially its most severe definition? Below is a series of quotes collected from the sources that have been part of our research:
“It seems harder to believe that the bodies of the damned are to remain in endless torment.” (Augustine)
“No evangelical, I think, need hesitate to admit that in his heart of hearts he would like universalism to be true. Who can take pleasure in the thought of people being eternally lost? If you want to see folks damned, there is something wrong with you.” (Packer)
“The thought of Hell… can carry no inherent attraction to the balanced and coherent human mind.” (Ferguson)
“I do not want to believe in it” (Alcorn)
“Most Christians have natural problems with the concept of eternal punishment.” (Walvoord)
“Truly pious people naturally wish that all people would be saved” (Calvin)
"Of all the doctrines of Christianity, Hell is probably the most difficult to defend, the most burdensome to believe and the first to be abandoned.” (Kreeft)
“I have thought about this subject for more than fifty years… Now I feel the time has come when I must declare my mind honestly. I believe that endless torment is a hideous and unscriptural doctrine which has been a terrible burden on the mind of the church for many centuries and a terrible blot on her presentation of the Gospel. I should be very happy if, before I die, I could help sweep it away.” (Wenham)
“Let me say at the outset that I consider the concept of Hell as endless torment in body and mind an outrageous doctrine, a theological and moral enormity, a bad doctrine of the tradition which needs to be changed. How can Christians possibly project a deity of such cruelty and vindictiveness whose ways include inflicting everlasting torture upon his creatures, however sinful they may have been? Surely a God who would do such a thing is more nearly like Satan than like God, at least by any moral standards, and by the gospel itself.” (Pinnock)
“Emotionally, I find the concept intolerable.” (Stott)
“The dogma that God wants everlasting punishment for the vast majority of humanity had always bothered me.” (Bonda)
“The conventional doctrine of Hell has too often engendered a view of a deity who suffers from borderline personality disorder or some worse sociopathic diagnosis.” (McLaren)
“There is no doctrine which I would more willingly remove from Christianity than this, if it lay in my power.” (Lewis)
“We are told that it is a detestable doctrine—and indeed, I too detest it from the bottom of my heart.” (Lewis)
“Why then have so many theologians abandoned the traditional doctrine of Hell? The answer to this is straightforward: the doctrine is widely regarded to be morally indefensible.” (Walls)
Though these quotes come from people holding a variety of perspectives, all of the above quotes are directed at the everlasting misery view of Hell. Supporters of this view routinely express such sentiment, but then dismiss it as irrelevant, insisting that we must never build doctrines from our instincts and/or emotions. Others give this type of evidence a small bit of weight. Walls states, “what people actually believe about Hell is relevant initial evidence, but [it is] no more than that.” For our purposes, the sentiments expressed in these quotations are certainly not our primary source for determining the truth about Hell (that would be Scripture), but neither should they be simply dismissed. In fact, they should be taken more seriously than they typically have been. After all, all of the above quotes come from professing Christians. Especially Wesleyans, who emphasize heart level transformation, should consider whether our sentiment against everlasting misery is actually evidence against the view. Does our judgment, as spiritual people, represent the mind of Christ?
Certainly such evidence should not be taken too far. After all, non-Christians seem to share this sentiment against everlasting misery. Then again, if the feeling is mutual between Christians and non-Christians alike, perhaps that only strengthens the evidence. It could be argued that we also have an instinctual desire to see sin punished, as if this is support for the everlasting misery view. Such an instinct is granted, but all three of the views we have been discussing include some form of punishment. Perhaps objections such as these would make sense if we were discussing instant extinction or instant restoration, but we are not.
Hell and Mission
Of the three views of Hell we have discussed, which view best motivates the mission of the church? One could strongly argue that if the wicked will eventually be restored, then there would be a missing motivation to evangelize in the here and now. J. I. Packer says strongly, “If all people are… ‘doomed to be saved,’ then it follows that the decisiveness of decisions made in this life, and the urgency of evangelism here in this life, immediately, are undermined… You can see what the missionary implications of this are going to be.” Another author adds, “It would surely comfort our consciences as Christians. We would not need to worry about the fact that we had not witnessed to our agnostic and unrepentant colleagues at work.”
At least one author supporting the eventual restoration position admits, “the theme of Christian mission and evangelism is central to the New Testament. If Christian universalism undermines it, then that is a clear indicator that it is incompatible with a biblical theology.” But he goes on to argue that, while the doctrine of everlasting misery has been a catalyst of evangelism, it is not the best or preferred missional motivation. The Gospel is the good news of the Kingdom of God. It is the good news of love and life everlasting, not the bad news of Hell. Our motivation in missions is to spread the news of God’s love. We should do it because the sooner someone knows the love of God, the sooner they may begin to experience the abundant life. Pinnock adds, “the fear of Hell is not the primary motivation for missions. The deepest motive of all is to see the kingdom come and God’s rule established.”
That we would be less motivated to witness if Hell were either a place of eventual extinction or eventual restoration is an alarming claim. Would such a scenario indicate that we are OK with people going to Hell so long as they are only there for a limited duration of time? If that is the case, there are bigger problems in our hearts and minds than our beliefs about Hell. More likely, fear over the impact of these minority views of Hell is directed at non-Evangelical versions of the doctrines. As above, this argument makes more sense if we’re talking in terms of immediate extinction and/or immediate restoration. Both the eventual extinction and eventual restoration positions that we have been discussing, however, include time in Hell.
We must also consider slightly altering our original question. Instead of asking which view most naturally motivates evangelism, what we if we asked which view has done the most overall harm to the mission? Multiple prominent atheists have considered the doctrine of everlasting misery a primary stumbling block between them and Christian theism. How could a supposedly loving God, who commands us to love our enemies, be content with the everlasting misery of many human beings? Could it be that, “When Western Christendom not only backed away from, but actually condemned, the idea of universal reconciliation, it also… backed away from the only consistent theology of love”? Church history post-Augustine is sometimes seen as suggesting such a theory.
By all accounts, our doctrine of Hell does and always has impacted mission. One of John Wesley Hanson’s conclusions from his study on universalism in the early church is that, “the idea that false threats were necessary to keep the common people in check, and that the truth might be held esoterically, prevailed among the earlier Christians.” Hanson is suggesting that early supporters of the eventual restoration position purposefully taught a view of Hell they didn’t necessarily believe in because of its pragmatic value. While we may not support such a policy, we must be certain to weigh carefully the impact that our doctrine of Hell will have on the church and the world. This is an area requiring further exploration in the current dialogue about Hell.
Hell and Pastors
In practice, pastors are often resident theologians for the local church community. While in today’s culture it is easy for parishioners to access the wealth of resources now available on the topic, pastors still play a prominent role in developing what church members think about Hell. This development may take place when the pastor preaches, counsels, or conducts funeral services. Likewise, a lack of development may take place if the pastor chooses to avoid the subject altogether or if there is a “struggle to communicate this most difficult topic in an accessible way.” Popular author Brian McLaren notes that “many theologians and preachers like myself have downplayed or entirely dropped the idea of Hell in our writing and preaching. Perhaps intuitively, we have known that something is wrong and so we’ve backed off until we figure out the problem.”
McLaren has written a novel about a modern day pastor and his struggles concerning the subject of Hell. Prompted by a question from his daughter, Pastor Dan Poole begins obsessing over the issue. When his questioning finds its way into his preaching, he is put on leave by the church board. Meanwhile, he is advised by a mentor to study the issue via Scripture, logic, history, and his heart (as we have done in this thesis). Pastor Poole never comes to any concrete conclusions except that there is something wrong with the traditional view, at least how it has been understood and utilized. In being honest about his lack of clarity, however, his church experiences a revival of sorts through their renewed emphasis on love and good works instead of details about doctrine.
It is important that pastors take the time to develop their own thoughts on Hell. “[We must] recognize that this matter merits deep solemnity and soberness. It is biblically indefensible to ignore or marginalize Hell, but neither is it something to be relished.” Pastors must preach Hell, and the first step to preaching it may be discovering why it has so long been avoided. The general avoidance of the subject may be evidence that something is wrong. It is time for a fresh look at Hell. If such an examination takes place, it must be kept in mind that it may not yield concrete conclusions, but what is wrong with not having all the answers?
Both pastors who seemingly only talk about Hell and pastors who avoid it as much as possible evidence the fact that something is wrong with the doctrine as we know it. The time has come to either declare, to clarify, to deconstruct, and/or to rebuild our thoughts on Hell. Sinclair Ferguson, in his essay on the preacher and Hell, gives three helpful suggestions. First, pastor’s must preach that Hell is a reality (all three views agree with this). Second, there must be a return to the biblical language about Hell in our sermons (this is preferable to doctrinal language and leaves room for the congregation to be led by the Spirit to their own interpretation). Third, Hell must never be the final word (we must always return to the good news that salvation is available). Pastors must have the courage to speak of Hell, but they also need the courage to admit lingering questions and ambiguities.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
We have attempted to provide a fresh evaluation of the nature of Hell in light of Scripture, reason, tradition, and experience. One author, attempting a similar evaluation as we have been pursuing, chimed, “in an ideal world, the four sources would beautifully dovetail and lead to clear conclusions.” But in reality, as another points out, “it’s not easy to hold all four together.” Each view encounters strengths and weaknesses in each of the four areas.
We explored some of the leading exegetical arguments for the everlasting misery position on Hell. While the Old Testament did not offer much support, it left us with two interesting passages that serve as a bridge to the New Testament teaching on Hell. Jesus himself was most adamant about the reality and nature of Hell, especially by expressing “eternal punishment” and “eternal life” with such symmetry. Finally, the Book of Revelation provides seemingly clear statements about the unending nature of torment to be experienced by all those opposed to God.
We examined some of the key passages (and listed others) referred to by advocates for the eventual extinction perspective of Hell. Proponents claim a general affirmation of their view from the Old Testament. The New Testament is even clearer in affirming that the wicked will eventually be extinguished. Pinnock summarizes for us, “Throughout its pages, following the Old Testament lead, the New Testament employs images of death, perishing, destruction, and corruption to describe the end of the wicked.”
Proponents of eventual restoration suggest that the Old Testament begins and ends with a vision of God’s love and care for all people. His goal to restore all people to right relationship with him through Jesus Christ is made most clear by Paul who aggressively states that Jesus’ sacrifice on the cross brings justification to all people. Ultimately, every individual will bow before God as their Lord. Christ’s victory will be complete and all encompassing. God is love. Love wins.
We also examined some of the leading biblical critiques of each view. Indeed, the strength of these views is seen not so much in their supporting texts (most will grant that some texts seem to support each view), but in how Scriptural counter-evidence is dealt with. Of course, determining the outcome of this point/counter-point dialogue is, to a degree, a matter of personal evaluation.
All three views of Hell are pressed to make adjustments in light of reason. The everlasting misery perspective seemingly must adjust to allow for continued freedom in Hell and, possibly, for the possibility of mobility. The eventual extinction position must attempt to argue its case that human immortality is wholly conditional upon ones relationship to Jesus Christ. The eventual restoration position may need to become more hopeful than certain about the future in light of human freedom. It is fairly safe to suggest, however, that in the rubric of reason, the everlasting misery position faces the most difficulty. Most advocates of the view will admit this is the case, and appeal to the supposed clarity of Scripture in support of their view. The eventual restoration position seems to be helped by the rubric of reason. Whether or not the eventual extinction position receives positive support here largely depends on what side of the immortality debate one comes down on.
When it comes to tradition, once again, we have seen some ambiguity amidst the evidence. In the early church, everlasting misery and eventual restoration seem to have been prominent, but all three views were present and accounted for. In the medieval church, the everlasting misery position certainly dominated the Western church and was passed down to the Reformers. The Post-Reformation church, at least evangelically speaking, has largely received this inheritance. The past few decades, however, have witnessed the return of, first, the eventual extinction position and more recently the eventual restoration view. One’s evaluation of where the evidence of tradition points will depend largely on how one weighs the different segments of church history. If the three periods discussed above are given equal weight, then certainly the everlasting misery position has been the dominant view. If one favors the earliest church, as Wesley did, then one may choose to be less dogmatic about the nature of Hell and recognize the validity of each of the three views. Likewise, if one has a continually progressive view of revelation, the contemporary setting seems to match, in many ways, the reality in the early church. All three views are being advocated, written about, and considered.
Having looked into three areas where the doctrine of Hell meets our experiences (emotion, evangelism, exhortation), we must again conclude that the evidence is somewhat ambiguous. At an emotional level, we revolt against the idea of Hell in general, but especially the concept of everlasting misery. While we cannot make conclusions based on these emotions, we should consider why so many people with Christian character have a hard time accepting this interpretation of Hell. In regards to evangelism, we must take seriously the effect that different views of Hell may have on the church’s mission. The everlasting misery view has indeed provoked missionary zeal and warnings of torment have prompted many conversions. If eventual extinction and/or eventual restoration are to be considered, the reality of Hell must still be emphasized even in its limited duration. That many preachers have avoided the subject of Hell may alert us to the fact that there’s some level of discomfort with the received doctrine. That discomfort may be based on the content of the doctrine or the lack of courage in the preacher. In any case, we best figure it out because Hell is a Scriptural reality and needs to be presented from the pulpit.
In light of the evidence, it is to be concluded that real ambiguities remain about the nature of Hell in regards to Scripture, reason, tradition, and experience. The case for everlasting misery depends on a few key New Testament texts, an emphasis on the gravity of sin and the need for justice, the fact that it has dominated church tradition since Augustine, and the fruit it has yielded in evangelism. The case for eventual extinction depends on the key words used to talk about the fate of the wicked throughout the canon of Scripture, the natural mortality of humanity, evidence of its support at both ends of church history, and our sense that everlasting misery does not fit with the character of God. The case for eventual restoration comes mainly from some important Pauline texts, an emphasis on the love of God, reference to its early advocates, and the fact that Christ-like persons hope it to be true.
Our findings do not lead to clear-cut conclusions. We cannot declare a winner of the Scripture (or any other category). Much of the material is subject to the interpretation of each individual. Nor do our findings call for the outright elimination of any of these three views. It is a growing trend amongst Evangelicals to accept the eventual extinction view as a possibility, but maintain that the eventual restoration view is out of bounds. Our conclusion is that a Christian could hold any of these three positions because all three views remain possibilities after critique through the Wesleyan Quadrilateral.
Our research has shown that not only are all three views worthy of consideration, but mergers between the views are quite possible. Everlasting misery and eventual extinction may be merged if one insists that the destruction of one thing always leads to the emergence of something else. Perhaps the wicked cease to exist as human beings, but do not become wholly extinct. N. T. Wright takes just such a merged view when he says, “it is possible for human beings to continue down this road [of rejecting God], that after death they become at last, by their own effective choice, beings that once were human but now are not, creatures that have ceased to bear the divine image at all.”
Everlasting misery may be combined with eventual restoration if one simply posits that repentance forever remains a possibility. “One of the more intriguing trends in current evangelical theology is the growing number of evangelical theologians since the 1960s who have either endorsed or seriously entertained the concept of ‘second chance’ or ‘post-mortem’ evangelism.” This group now includes, at least, George Beasley Murray, Charles Cranfield, Donald Bloesch, Clark Pinnock, Gabriel Fackre and Nigel Wright. In such a scenario, Hell will remain a place of everlasting misery so long as one being remains unrepentant.
Likewise, eventual extinction could potentially be combined with the eventual restoration view. Jan Bonda, arguing from the eventual restoration perspective, speculates at the end of his book: “One question remains: Will there be people who persist in their refusal to make that choice [to repent]? We have also left this aside. God has given each human being the free choice to say No to him… Could this No result in nothingness—annihilation? Surely, that is possible… Scripture does not allow us to affirm that this will not happen. We do not know everything!”
Indeed, all three views could potentially be combined. Charles Seymour, attempting to reasonably defend the possibility of everlasting misery, reforms Hell to the degree that it includes both the possibilities of eventual extinction and eventual restoration. He attempts to save the everlasting misery view from critique by emphasizing freedom, but admits “by introducing freedom into the afterlife, I make Heaven and Hell unstable. There is nothing to prevent someone in Hell from repenting and entering Heaven” Indeed, he suggests that it is “possible that none will ever repent, but not plausible.” Though he was critical of eventual extinction throughout his work, in the end he confesses that “it is possible that some damned choose to continue sinning and that others choose annihilation.” It seems some of the strongest contemporary defenses of Hell include a merger the views we have been discussing.
The above conclusions may come as a surprise to many Evangelicals. After all, the everlasting misery perspective has enjoyed a long reign as the commonly accepted position on the fate of the wicked. Must it now face its rivals afresh? Lesslie Newbigin, in his book The Gospel in a Pluralistic Society, discusses how revelation, reason, tradition and experience help us pursue the truth.
All traditions of rational discourse are continually changing in the effort to make sense of experience. Old formations and concepts are called in question as not being adequate to the realities which the community is facing. Sometimes the tradition is strong and flexible enough to respond to the new situation without much radical break from the past. Sometimes this does not happen. The tradition faces a crisis. There are internal self-contradictions: there are experiences which cannot be understood in terms of the existing ways of thought. At this point another, rival tradition of rationality appears on the scene—perhaps one that was always present but muted by the success of the reigning tradition, perhaps a new arrival. It confronts the reigning tradition with a radical challenge. It offers another way of seeing things, another vision of the shape of things and of the human story, a paradigm shift. Some, perhaps many, adherents of the old tradition find the new one more adequate to the realities they face, and are converted to the new view. The fact that this happens demonstrates that while all exercise of rationality is within a social tradition, the tradition is not ultimate; it is subject to the test of adequacy to the realities which it seeks to grasp. Truth is grasped, can only be grasped, within a tradition, but traditions can be and are judged adequate or inadequate in respect of their perceived capacity to lead their adherents into the truth.
In our case, the tradition is the belief that Hell is a place of everlasting misery. This tradition is, more and more, being critiqued as inadequate on various grounds. The tradition has flexed to respond to these critiques, but it is far from certain if and how it will survive. Meanwhile, rival traditions from the past have re-emerged. The presence of three competing perspectives of Hell need not be seen as a sign of confusion, but as a path to greater clarity. The tradition may well regain its privileged position, but with greater nuance and strength. If, however, a new tradition develops, we can only hope it will emerge because of its closeness to the truth.
A Sample Resolution for the Wesleyan Church
CONSTITUTION: DESTINY
21. Destiny
250. We believe that the Scriptures clearly teach that there is a conscious personal existence after death. The final destiny of each person is determined by God's grace and that person's response, evidenced inevitably by a moral character which results from that individual's personal and volitional choices and not from any arbitrary decree of God. Heaven with its eternal glory and the blessedness of Christ's presence is the final abode of those who choose the salvation which God provides through Jesus Christ, but Hell with its everlasting misery and separation from God is the final abode of those who neglect this great salvation.
Whereas, the Article of Religion on Destiny lends itself to a particular view of Hell;
Whereas, a Scriptural case may be made for other views regarding the fate of the wicked;
Whereas, there may be reasonable objections to the ‘everlasting misery’ perspective;
Whereas, other understandings of Hell have been present throughout church history;
Whereas, the doctrine of Hell is in need of fresh and open-minded evaluation;
Whereas, removing two words creates room for a variety of interpretations of Hell;
Whereas, the reality of Hell as a place of misery/separation would still be insisted upon;
Resolved, that the final sentence of Article 21 be amended by striking the words ‘everlasting’ and ‘final’ and thus read:
21. Destiny
250. We believe that the Scriptures clearly teach that there is a conscious personal existence after death. The final destiny of each person is determined by God's grace and that person's response, evidenced inevitably by a moral character which results from that individual's personal and volitional choices and not from any arbitrary decree of God. Heaven with its eternal glory and the blessedness of Christ's presence is the final abode of those who choose the salvation which God provides through Jesus Christ, but Hell with its misery and separation from God is the abode of those who neglect this great salvation.
ENDNOTES
Christopher Morgan and Robert Peterson, Hell Under Fire (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2004), 16.
The Wesleyan Church is an evangelical, Protestant denomination of nearly 400,000 constituents in 5,000 churches and missions in 80 countries of the world. Formed in 1968 resulting from the mergers of several like-minded groups, dating back as far as 1843, The Wesleyan Church has its roots in John Wesley's Methodism. For more information see
http://wesleyan.org/.
Taken from the 2008 Discipline of the Wesleyan Church.
This has been my (albeit limited) experience. I have taught about the multiple views of Hell in no less than five Wesleyan settings and each time the response has been one of surprise (“I never knew of these other views before”) and thankfulness (“I’m glad you shared this, it definitely gives me something to think about”).
Don Thorsen, The Wesleyan Quadrilateral: A Model of Evangelical Theology. (Lexington, KY: Emeth, 2005), 6.
Thomas Oden, John Wesley’s Scriptural Christianity (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2004), 55.
Thorsen, 1.
Randy Maddox, Responsible Grace: John Wesley’s Practical Theology (Nashville, TN: Kingswood Books, 1994), 37.
Oden, 55.
Thorsen, 76.
Maddox, 37.
Oden, 57.
Maddox, 37.
Ibid, 38.
Thorsen, 86.
Ibid., 90.
Maddox, 36-40.
Oden, 71.
Quoted in Thorsen, 107.
Oden, 75.
Maddox, 40.
Thorsen, 93.
Maddox, 42.
Thorsen, 95.
Ibid., 102.
Maddox, 44.
Thorsen, 129.
Ibid., 135.
Ibid., 144.
Oden, 91.
Leslie Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 1989), 52-53.
It is important to be clear, here, that we are discussing views of Hell (post-Judgment Day) and not the intermediate state.
David Hilborn, The Nature of Hell: A Report by the Evangelical Alliance Commission on Unity and Truth Among Evangelicals (Waynesboro, GA: Paternoster Publishing USA, 2000), 37.
Morgan and Peterson, 59.
Ibid., 59.
Robert Peterson, Hell on Trial: The Case for Eternal Punishment (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995), 29.
Ibid.
Morgan and Peterson, 59.
All Scripture quotations in this paper are from the New International Version.
Quoted by Peterson, 32.
Morgan and Peterson, 60.
Peterson, 35.
Ibid.
Morgan and Peterson, 63.
Ibid., 65
Peterson, 54.
Ibid., 55.
Saint Augustine, The City of God (New York: Doubleday, 1958), 506.
Ibid.
Edward Fudge and Robert Peterson, Two Views of Hell (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2000), 145.
Peterson, 47.
Fudge and Peterson, 147.
Peterson, 64.
Morgan and Peterson, 74.
Blomberg, 206.
Morgan and Peterson, 74.
Randy Alcorn, Heaven (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 2004), 25-26.
Morgan and Peterson, 92.
Hilborn, 49.
Morgan and Peterson, 108.
Peterson, 81.
Fudge and Peterson, 160.
Ibid., 161.
Ibid.
Ibid., 164.
Morgan and Peterson, 130.
William Crockett, Ed., Four Views of Hell (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1996), 156.
Thomas Talbott, The Inescapable Love of God (Salem, OR: Willamette University, 2002), 88.
Crockett, 155-156.
Craig Blomberg, Interpreting the Parables (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity, 1990), 206.
See Alcorn, 25-26.
Gregory MacDonald, The Evangelical Universalist (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2006), 152.
Ibid., 152.
Crockett, 157.
Fudge, 306.
MacDonald, 106-132.
Ibid., 106.
Ibid., 109.
Charles Seymour, A Theodicy of Hell (Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 183.
Gregory Boyd and Paul Eddy, Across the Spectrum: Understanding Issues in Evangelical Theology, 2nd Ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009), 287.
Edward Fudge, The Fire that Consumes: A Biblical and Historical Study of the Doctrine of Final Punishment (Verdict Publications, 1982), 97-100.
Ibid., 160.
Hilborn, 43.
Fudge, The Fire that Consumes, 161.
Hilborn, 43.
Ibid., 46.
Ibid., 74
Fudge, The Fire that Consumes, 265.
Quoted in Fudge, The Fire that Consumes, 277.
Peterson, 161-182.
Ibid., 177.
Ibid., 178.
Ibid., 163.
Morgan and Peterson, 206.
Morgan and Peterson, 205.
Morgan and Peterson, 203.
Talbott, 99.
Talbott, 102.
Jan Bonda, The One Purpose of God: An Answer to the Doctrine of Eternal Punishment (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1993), 199.
MacDonald, 72.
Ibid., 100.
Ibid., 80.
Ibid., 98
Ibid., 99
Talbott, 69.
Talbott, 70.
Robin Parry and Christopher Partridge, Universal Salvation? The Current Debate (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdman’s Publishing Compnay, 2003), 63.
Ibid., 65.
Ibid., 68.
Ibid., 69.
James Garlow, Heaven and the Afterlife (Bloomington, MN: Bethany House Publishers), 211.
MacDonald, 133.
Ibid., 147.
Ibid., 148.
Quoted in Hilborn, 102.
Quoted in Hilborn, 103.
Wilko van Holten, “Can the Traditional View of Hell be Defended?: An Evaluation of some Arguments for Eternal Punishment,” Anglican Theological Review 85 no 3 (2003): 465.
Ibid., 467.
Crockett, 27.
Holten, 468.
Talbott, 149.
Holten, 469.
Quoted in Holten, 470.
Hilborn, 106.
Seymour, 139.
Jerry Walls, The Logic of Damnation (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992.), 124-129.
Peterson, 178.
Ibid., 179.
MacDonald, 165.
Talbott, 183.
Parry, 115.
Walls, 125.
Ibid., 113.
Ibid., 129.
Ibid., 130.
Pardy, 111.
Talbott, 189.
Walls, 136.
N. Gregersen, “Guilt, shame, and rehabilitation: the pedagogy of divine judgment,” Dialog, 39(2), (2000): 115.
Seymour, 96.
Ibid., 96.
Talbott, 107.
Ibid., 201.
C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (New York: HarperOne, 1996), 130.
Morgan and Peterson, 205.
Ibid., 205.
Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli, Handbook of Christian Apologetics (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 1994), 287.
Ibid., 301.
Ibid., 307-308.
Fudge, The Fire that Consumes, 54.
Ibid., 67.
Morgan and Peterson, 86.
Hilborn, 99.
Gregersen, “Guilt, shame, and rehabilitation: the pedagogy of divine judgment,” 116.
Maddox, 42.
Ibid., 43.
Ibid., 44.
Hilborn, 53.
Peterson, 99.
Ibid.
Fudge, The Fire that Consumes, 338.
Ibid., 321.
Hilborn, 61.
Fudge, The Fire that Consumes, 325-326.
John Wesley Hanson, Universalism: The Prevailing Doctrine of the Christian Church During its First Five Hundred Years (Boston, MA: Universalist Publishing House, 1899), 116.
Ibid., 148.
Ibid., 176.
Ibid., 236.
Ibid., 242.
Ibid., 174.
Crockett, 138.
Hanson, 15.
Seymour, 25.
Crockett, 139.
Bonda, 25.
Quoted in Bonda, 16.
Bonda, 17.
Hilborn, 55.
Ibid., 56.
Saint Augustine, 505.
Hanson, 274.
Hilborn, 56.
Fudge, The Fire that Consumes, 374.
Ibid., 375.
Frank Burch Brown, “The Beauty of Hell: Anselm on God's Eternal Design.” Journal Of Religion, 73(3), (1993): 343.
Seymour, 121.
Fudge, The Fire that Consumes, 377.
Parry and Partridge, 198-199.
Hilborn, 132.
Edward Fudge, Hell a Final Word (Abiline, TX: Leafwood Publishers, 2012), 19.
Statement available at
http://richardbauckham.co.uk/uploads/Ac ... e/Hell.pdf
Crockett, 159.
Bonda, 25.
Saint Augustine, 494.
Packer, quoted in Morgan and Peterson, 32.
Morgan and Peterson, 220.
Alcorn, 26.
Crockett, 11.
Quoted in Bonda, 15.
Kreft and Tacelli, 282.
Quoted in Bonda, 259.
Quoted in Morgan and Peterson, 34.
Quoted in Morgan and Peterson, 220.
Bonda, 6.
Brian McLaren, The Last Word and the Word After That: A Tale of Faith, Doubt, and a New Kind of Christianity (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2005), xix.
Lewis, 119-120
Ibid.
Walls, 3.
Ibid., 32.
Quoted in MacDonald, 168.
Quoted in MacDonald, 168.
Macdonald, 169.
Clark Pinnock, A Wideness in God’s Mercy: The Finality of Jesus Christ in a World of Religions (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1992), 178.
Talbott, 34.
Hanson, 305.
Hilborn, 112.
McLaren, xix-xx.
McLaren, 57.
Hilborn, 112.
Morgan and Peterson 226-228
Macdonald, 9.
McLaren, 58.
Crockett, 146.
Lewis, 127.
N.T. Wright, Surprised by Hope: Rethinking Heaven, the Resurrection, and the Mission of the Church (New York: HarperOne, 2008), 182.
Partridge and Parry, 229.
Bonda, 259.
Seymour, 88.
Ibid., 167.
Ibid., 185.
Newbigin, 55.
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