The deficiency of the assumption that Jesus allows divorce

[mattrose]

I know that your position is 'no divorce' after the wedding ceremony. I've known this all along.

In my opinion your thread suffers from 2 problems. I hate to say it, but 1) You do not write very well. I might guess this is because you are writing while emotionally charged and it leads to confusing sentences. 2) You do not read very well. Again, I'd guess it is because you are reading very emotionally and missing the point of the responses. This is clearly indicated by your confusion over whether I understand your position.

You have also failed to respond to those who have tried to honestly ask questions of you or make counter-arguments. I've explained my position a number of times and you keep insisting on things that you haven't proven, such as:

1) that the greek in question refers only to pre-marital sex
2) that the more common understanding of the text cannot account for the last clause

Neither of these points of yours is true. Also, neither of these points has really been argued except by re-statement.

Based on the above, why should the dialogue continue if its not going anywhere productive? If you have direct questions about the texts in question, feel free to ask. But if we're going to be playing the game of me trying to figure out what your poorly worded posts mean so that I can attempt to defend a position that I don't actually hold... I'm probably too busy for that.

I'm not trying to end the discussion. I actually enjoy discussing views that are different from mine. But if you're interested in continuing the discussion with me, your posts need to be shorter (more pointed), clearer (more crafted), and about the text itself (rather than labeling models).

[AVoice]

What legitimate objection exists against the betrothal explanation?

I don't think it is an impossible interpretation. I just think it is not the best interpretation given the range of meaning in the greek according to most scholars I've read. Jesus is sharpening the meaning of God's law. They were practicing 'easy-divorce.' Jesus is saying that divorce is not allowed while providing an exception to that general rule. And that's where I think your argument is pretty weak. You are trying to prove that divorce is not allowed at all, but you are admitting that a divorce was necessary to obtain to get out of a betrothal and that this was allowed by Jesus in the case of pre-marital sexual sin. So we all believe there is an exception to the 'no-divorce' rule. You have a very strict interpretation of that exception whereas some others here have a more flexible interpretation. Bottom line, you believe Jesus allows divorce too.

The immediate context of Matt 5;32 and 19:9 is absolutely the post marital divorce.
So yes, Jesus does not allow the post marital divorce which puts asunder what is declared by the Word as what God has joined together. There is no exception to what Jesus was talking about, which was the post marital divorces.

That is one of the reasons for Jesus to have included the exception clause, even though it did not pertain to the post marital divorces which he was talking about: to clarify that his total prohibition of men divorcing their wives was not in any way intended to extend so far to those who were not even joined in marriage yet. Jesus' definition of marriage based on Gen 2 is the leaving and cleaving. Obviously the definition of what God has joined, which man is not to put asunder, was NOT intended for those who are not together as husband and wife but who are only promised/betrothed.

When a duality of meanings exist of the same words, in this case 'divorce' 'husband' and 'wife', certain statements can be made which someone without that understanding can assume to be irreconcilably contradictory to each other.
Divorce is allowed
Divorce is not allowed.
Such is the case when viewing 5:32 and 19:9 alongside Mark 10:11,12 and Luke 16:18.

When the exception clause is viewed as a complete aside, that is a "non essential" it can be totally omitted and yet the meaning has not changed one little bit.
By viewing the exception as "essential" under the divorce for adultery model, leaving it out would agree with the plain prohibition of Mark and Luke. And the divorce for adultery advocates will have none of that.
The fact that it cannot be left out completely is evidence in itself that the exception clause under your model is not an "aside" meaning "non essential".
It is absolutely "essential" by that model, it is not an aside that can be left out.

This is a major argument against the argument about except for the sign of Jonah and the 'exceptions" concerning what Jesus said about giving. Those kinds of exceptions are "non essential" like the exception of fornication, being merely reiterations (and hence omittable), of what the context already suggests or includes.
The contexts without the exception clause do not in any way imagineable suggest or include the notion of divorce for adultery. Concerning the actual texts themselves, without the exception clause the notion of divorce for adultery is non compatible.

[AVoice]

1) that the greek in question refers only to pre-marital sex
2) that the more common understanding of the text cannot account for the last clause

Neither of these points of yours is true. Also, neither of these points has really been argued except by re-statement.

quote]

Concerning 1) I explained clearly in this post:

If in fact the exception clause was spoken as an interjected side point as a reference to that OTHER kind of divorce, which was done premaritally as what Joseph was about to do, then the one word to describe that sexual offence would be "fornication".
The word adultery would not apply since it was a sin committed while as the person was single and the divorce took place also before the marriage. They both retain their status as single. Hence the man does not cause her to commit adultery.

Based on the popular interpretation of the exception clause they define "fornication". That is circular reasoning. In the same line of circular reasoning "fornication is changed to "sexual immorality". The Greek is able to make the equivalent of the word 'sexual' and also of the word 'immorality'. Jesus did not use that terminology.
He used the equivalent of the English "fornication" which like in English can apply specifically to the unmarried sexual offence.
For example ask a Greek scholar if the following is reasonable, which context indicates the sexual offense CANNOT be adultery but which is in fact "fornication". So some 'fornication" CAN be adultery but it is possible that the particular context absolutely rejects "adultery" as being what fornication can mean in that context.
Knowing that Jane and John are single:

"Jane and John were caught fornicating"

To allocate adultery as what fornication means in this context would be an act of illiteracy.
Would not the equivalent statement about Jane and John, if translated into Greek, also use the word fornication? Are you asserting that the word fornication in Greek is not used in this same way applying specifically to the premarital where contexts can accomodate that application?
The word fornication has a specific premarital application since it is the one single word (at least in English) that can by itself describe the sexual sin of the single. It has connotation that "sexual immorality" does not possess. Since 'adultery' specifically relates to the violation of a marriage, the word fornication when listed alongside "adultery" (as it does 7 times in the NT) naturally points to, and absolutely includes, the premarital sexual sin in comparison.

I suppose you did not read that post. A forward direction in discussing this point concerning "fornication" would be evidenced by a reply to this.
You were not clear concerning 1). The wording of point 1) above suggests that you understand that I am saying the word fornication has to mean premarital sex in whatever context it is found. Please refer to any place I have written where I gave you that impression.

Concerning your point 2) above:
In the following post the direct texts that Jesus spoke were applied for discussion:

Under your ‘divorce for adultery’ model there exits a just and unjust divorce. The ‘just’ divorce is for the wife's adultery, the unjust divorce is for, let's say, burning dinner.
The way Matthew says it in 19:9 indicates that the last clause means exactly what it plainly says even after the man who unjustly divorces his wife marries another.
What would indicate that that last clause cannot mean what it very plainly says even after the man who divorced his wife unjustly has 'married another'? Even after he marries another, that last clause still has to mean what it says as it pertains to the unjustly divorced woman; in effect, whoever marries her who was divorced for burning dinner commits adultery.

Matthew 19:
9And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery.

So do you still maintain that the "her", which the last clause refers to, is the unjustly divorced woman? Would you perhaps under your divorce-for-adultery model be willing to reconsider and try to apply the "her" in that last clause to the woman who was divorced "justly"?

Choosing the "justly" divorced woman as to whom the last clause must apply is even more confused. Jesus very clearly contradicts himself in the same breath if that route is taken. That is because in Matt 19:9 the man very clearly can marry after divorcing for adultery (under that model) yet concerning the woman divorced for adultery, it is plain whoever marries her commits adultery. So she is married to him but he is free and not married to her? Complete confusion.
The whole point is to show that the 'divorce for adultery' model does not work with the actual words Jesus used. It gets VERY messy.
Though explanations can be presented with reasons from the OT as has been done here, when compared to what Jesus actually said to see if his context supports such explanations, the explanations simply don't fit with the plain words. Very messy as can be expected when a "non essential" insertion within a sentence can be mistaken as "essential".
In the case of Matt 5;32; 19:9, the non essential addition into the sentence came in the form of an exception clause.

Though I was directly addressing Jesus' actual words, the various questions that the "divorce for adultery" model creates were not attempted to be answered by you. You assert that that model works but you have not attempted (as far as I know)to cooperate in the discussion by responding to the questions which the context and the text beg.

(rather than labeling models).

We are discussing two separate models. Identifying the one from the other is necessary and practical. How would you prefer to label and identify the differing positions?
Under the "divorce for adultery" model, thus and thus are the implications of the text WHEN fornication is assumed to mean adultery.
Under the "divorce in betrothal" model, thus and thus are the implications of the text when "fornication" is allowed to take on a definition it possesses pertaining exclusively to the premarital sexual sin.


Even in a recent post I asked if the implications of your explanation of the last clause are going to be reconsidered by you since that explanation would make the innocent woman off limits. You did not respond that I know of.
Also in a former post to you I revealed that if the last clause were taken to apply to the "justly" divorced wife (under your model) then the implication is that Jesus would then appear to have initiated a kind of NT polygamy. You did not answer.

Require of me an answer to any specific question. I commit to answer.

[AVoice]

Mattrose,
Here are the questions, which I am aware of, that you have up to this point asked:

The point that was raised earlier, which you simply dismissed, is a valid point. Why would sexual sin BEFORE the ceremony be a worse offense than sexual sin AFTER the ceremony? You can't have your cake (claim that betrothal counted and necessitated a 'divorce'... a point on which we agree) and have it too (claim that a betrothal divorce is not really a divorce).

A divorce that puts asunder what God has joined together is very different than a ‘divorce’ that simply terminates an engagement. The question makes absolutely no sense unless you supposed that the divorce for fornication I support was a divorce after marriage for fornication she committed before marriage, a position Steve addresses in his link. How can it be seen that my message somehow makes fornication before the ceremony worse than adultery?? I didn't even begin to answer because nothing I have written in any way indicates that premarital sex is worse than adultery. The person that raised the point apparently does not understand what my position is.

What is your goal is teaching us this truth? Are you aware of some on this board who are seeking 'easy-divorce'? Are there some on this message board who are advising others to get divorces on non-biblical grounds? Is it possible that this is a hobby horse for you? A way to vent over a terrible past experience? A way to feel like you are more faithful to God's Word? I don't know if any of these suggestions is true. I'm just wondering what compels you to passionately talk to strangers on this subject.

Being able to get a divorce for adultery is a lot easier than not being able to get a divorce at all.
Relatively speaking, everyone advocating divorce for adultery are supporting an “easy” divorce compared with the truth that the “one flesh” status of a joined-in-marriage couple is only breakable by death.
Everyone advising others that they may divorce for adultery, anywhere in the world, are giving counsel which is non-biblical.
I am not venting over a terrible past experience.
I am not doing it for ego.
I am passionate because I understand that God’s heart is passionate. He hates divorce. He is saddened that his children think of him as a God who would allow under the NT what he hates and what was only allowed under the OT for the hardness of their hearts. He wants his children to cease from being corrupted from the simplicity that is in Christ on this topic.
"Till death do us part" happens to be an accurate reflection of the truth.

Based on the above, why should the dialogue continue if its not going anywhere productive? If you have direct questions about the texts in question, feel free to ask. But if we're going to be playing the game of me trying to figure out what your poorly worded posts mean so that I can attempt to defend a position that I don't actually hold... I'm probably too busy for that.

If you would make an attempt to answer some of my actual questions I believe it can be more productive than it is. I do not understand your last statement. How would your inability to understand what I write, relate to your decision to defend a position you don’t actually hold? And why would you defend a position you don’t hold?

[Homer]

Relatively speaking, everyone advocating divorce for adultery are supporting an “easy” divorce compared with the truth that the “one flesh” status of a joined-in-marriage couple is only breakable by death.

The consumation of the marriage made the two "one flesh". When one of the two becomes "one flesh" with someone outside the marriage (1 Cor. 6:16), is there not already a "putting asunder" what God has joined together? Remember that in Jesus' day there was no marriage ceremony as we have it. They were married by becoming "one flesh" in the consumation of the marriage.

[mattrose]

Avoice,

I do intent to respond to your more recent (improved!) posts. It may be a few days since I have a busy weekend of weddings!

[AVoice]

Avoice,

I do intent to respond to your more recent (improved!) posts. It may be a few days since I have a busy weekend of weddings!

Matt 5:
31 It hath been said, Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement:
32 But I say unto you, That whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery: and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery.

Matt 19:
9 And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery.

Mark 10:
11 And he saith unto them, Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her.
12 And if a woman shall put away her husband, and be married to another, she committeth adultery.

Luke 16:
18 Whosoever putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery: and whosoever marrieth her that is put away from her husband committeth adultery.

Matt
I asked you, who do you understand the last clause pertains to and you answered the woman divorced for burning dinner, the innocent party. Under your model that is the most practical that is available. But if I were to ask why you chose that answer, I suppose that your answer would reveal that your interpreting ‘fornication” in that context to mean adultery is the basis for that decision. That model permits the termination of a joined married couple so if she is divorced allowably for adultery the marriage is ended, therefore whoever marries her cannot be committing adultery. The only person it can apply to is the woman divorced for burning dinner, the innocent party.
Since the divorce for adultery model creates an avenue of payback for a wrong done, the stage is set for fairness versus that which is not fair. Once it becomes fair (and lawful) under the NT by that model to divorce for adultery, it naturally appears not fair for the person dealt with unjustly to not be allowed to remarry. Most believers who embrace the divorce for adultery model cannot adopt on one hand disallowing remarriage for the innocent woman, while as the precedent of “fairness” to divorce has been set by the allowance of divorce for adultery. Would you care to comment on that?

Since your answer of who the last clause pertains to is based on the existence of the exception clause in the same verse, this creates questions that must be answered concerning the authors who did not include the exception clause and yet have the identical last clause or its equivalent. It would be grammatically impossible for that last clause to have the same meaning in Luke 16:18 as you say the identical last clause has in 5:32 and 19:9, because its very meaning in Matthew depends on the existence of the exception clause within the same verse. Since the meaning of the last clause in 5:32 and 19:9 hinges on the existence of the exception clause within the same verses, how can the identical last clause have that same meaning in Luke 16:18 without the exception clause, which is necessary to arrive at that meaning?
Luke is an entirely different author. If the last clause, as is necessary under your model, had to be spoken in connection to the existence of the exception of adultery, how could Luke have included the last clause but have omitted the exception of adultery on which its meaning depends? Without the exception clause, the last clause written by Luke has no other practical meaning than to apply to all divorced women as it plainly appears to be saying.
It seems the only avenue of reason is to claim that Luke’s text had to have been corrupted. This is because the only way of appointing only one of two women to whom that last clause pertains is if the passage possesses the exception clause (and it is interpreted to be for adultery) which creates that distinction.
Can you create a grammatical parallel that could demonstrate in one case a final clause whose meaning depends on an exception clause in the same sentence, and then somehow in another case have the identical sentence but with the exception clause omitted and the last clause still holds that same meaning?
Would you care to comment on that?

[AVoice]

Relatively speaking, everyone advocating divorce for adultery are supporting an “easy” divorce compared with the truth that the “one flesh” status of a joined-in-marriage couple is only breakable by death.

The consumation of the marriage made the two "one flesh". When one of the two becomes "one flesh" with someone outside the marriage (1 Cor. 6:16), is there not already a "putting asunder" what God has joined together? Remember that in Jesus' day there was no marriage ceremony as we have it. They were married by becoming "one flesh" in the consumation of the marriage.

Unless you take from the person the choice to forgive and not divorce after the adultery, the answer to your question is no. The adultery itself does not automatically put asunder what God has joined together. Your own position requires that the person makes that decision on whether the marriage is terminated. Therefore the divorce for adultery model permits man to put asunder what God has joined together. It is totally within the offended party's grasp to make that decision under that model.
The 'one flesh' of fornication is totally different than the lawful and binding one flesh of lawful marriage. The one binds by God's law the couple as one until death; the other does not lawfully bind but is a misuse of each of their bodies. Paul was using the "one flesh" terminology as a way of comparison to emphasize how wrong, out of order and confused fornication is. The "one flesh" status is reserved for marriage, to engage in fornicatiion is a total disorder of what the sexual act was intended for.
Earlier you had a question pertaining to somehow my position making premarital sex (fornication) more of a crime than adultery. Can you please reiterate that now under what I assume is a better understanding on your part on what I am defending?

[mattrose]

Avoice,

I have read your last 3 posts carefully (A few times over) and am prepared to make a number of responses. To keep things as simple as possible, I am not going to quote you, I will just respond to various questions/problems in point form below.

1. Their culture used the term 'divorce' even when addressing betrothed couples (as you are well aware, having mentioned the particular case of Joseph). Since we are to interpret the Bible in its cultural context, we must accept, then, that Jesus did allow for some form of divorce. In your case, you believed Jesus would have allowed for a betrothed man to 'divorce' if his bride-to-be had committed fornication (sex before marriage). So, again, whether you like it or not, you yourself interpret Jesus to mean that some divorce is allowed. When you APPLY your position to today's American context, it would allow for no divorce (since we don't require divorces to break engagements). This is all I meant by saying that you (And Jesus) did allow for divorce in some cases. Indeed, that's why the exception clause is an exception clause in both 'models'. This is a fairly minor point though.

2. You basically said that an aside need not be mentioned (I agree) and does not affect meaning (I disagree). An aside can be left out (by its very nature... that is what Mark and Luke do in this case). But an aside does provide nuance. Perhaps a major point of contention in our disagreement is that you are treating Jesus' words as if He is making an absolute rule and I am treating Jesus statement as a general principle. Almost every statement Jesus made can be made more clear with nuance. The key is that the nuance be based on Scriptural statements and principles as well.

3. You accuse others of using circular reasoning, but it seems to me both views can be accused of that. You assume the greek means fornication in this case and then use that belief to interpret the rest of the passage in an absolute sense rather than a general one. The bottom line is that the greek is flexible. And even when we add in the context, it remains flexible. You haven't shown that the context demands the absolute interpretation of Jesus' statement and, because of this, you haven't shown that the greek must be interpreted as fornication (pre-marital sex).

4. I know that you do not believe that the greek word ALWAYS refers only to fornication. I was simply stating that your view is that it refers only to fornication (pre-marital sex) in this passage.

5. Let me quote Matthew 19:9 so as to be clear

"I tell you that anyone who divorces his wife, except for sexual immorality, and marries another woman commits adultery.”

The "wife" in this verse is clearly someone divorced unjustly (since the justly divorced woman is the exception). The "woman" that the illegitimately divorced man marries is most likely a single woman who has agreed to marry this sinning man.

You went to great lengths to show me how messy it would be to interpret the justly divorced woman into this context. I don't understand why you would show me this since I had already answered that I apply it to the unjustly divorced woman. You have given me no reason to reject the more obvious reference.

My interpretation of the last phrase is NEVER based on the exception clause. I have no problem with the way the statement exists in Matthew, Mark OR Luke. Why do you keep insisting that my interpretation of the last clause MUST be based on my understanding of the exception clause? Indeed, I think the reverse is true. Your understanding of the exception clause (that it refers only to divorce during the betrothal period b/c of pre-marital sex) causes you to interpret Jesus' words in an absolute sense (though you are still mis-reading Paul in that case) rather than as a general statement that can be nuanced. I take the statement as a general statement, the thrust of which indicates that God hates divorce and it isn't allowed. Nuance needn't be included every time, but does help flesh out the application of the general truth.

6. "Till death do us part" is part of a covenant. Covenants should never be broken, but covenants certainly can be broken. Faithfulness to the covenant is a condition to almost every covenant I can imagine.

7. A man who divorces his wife unjustly is still married in God's eyes (whether the government has granted him a divorce or not). This means that both he and his wife are still married in God's eyes. The unjustly divorced woman, in this case, has the responsibility to confront this man (using the Matthew 18 principle) in a series of steps. If he repents, the marriage is restored. If he refuses to repent, then he is an unbeliever. Furthermore, he is an unbeliever wishing to divorce (as shown by his initiating the divorce). Thus, she should let him go (ala Paul). Then, of course, she is free to re-marry.

[AVoice]

Avoice,

5. Let me quote Matthew 19:9 so as to be clear

"I tell you that anyone who divorces his wife, except for sexual immorality, and marries another woman commits adultery.”

The "wife" in this verse is clearly someone divorced unjustly (since the justly divorced woman is the exception). The "woman" that the illegitimately divorced man marries is most likely a single woman who has agreed to marry this sinning man.

You went to great lengths to show me how messy it would be to interpret the justly divorced woman into this context. I don't understand why you would show me this since I had already answered that I apply it to the unjustly divorced woman. You have given me no reason to reject the more obvious reference.

My interpretation of the last phrase is NEVER based on the exception clause. I have no problem with the way the statement exists in Matthew, Mark OR Luke. Why do you keep insisting that my interpretation of the last clause MUST be based on my understanding of the exception clause? Indeed, I think the reverse is true. Your understanding of the exception clause (that it refers only to divorce during the betrothal period b/c of pre-marital sex) causes you to interpret Jesus' words in an absolute sense (though you are still mis-reading Paul in that case) rather than as a general statement that can be nuanced. I take the statement as a general statement, the thrust of which indicates that God hates divorce and it isn't allowed. Nuance needn't be included every time, but does help flesh out the application of the general truth.

Mattrose,
First of all I did give you a reason, because the innocent party would then be off limits. I clearly explained this to be an objection that even others would raise to appointing the last clause to the innocently divorced woman but you did not respond. This is the 3rd time I am bringing up this objection that many would have.

It is impossible to make sense of what you are talking about here in topic 5) because the last clause I have been referring to during the discussion of the "last clause" has never used this: "and marries another woman commits adultery”, as the last clause.
You quoted a paraphrase that has the last clause omitted. It is therefore impossible to make any sense of what you are talking about in this topic 5),

"I tell you that anyone who divorces his wife, except for sexual immorality, and marries another woman commits adultery.”

The "wife" in this verse is clearly someone divorced unjustly (since the justly divorced woman is the exception). The "woman" that the illegitimately divorced man marries is most likely a single woman who has agreed to marry this sinning man.

"The "wife" in this verse" with the last clause omitted appears to be a reference to the wife in the first clause!!
You did not specify that you are speaking of the wife the last clause pertains to, and with the last clause omitted, this is confusing.
Please reword this topic 5)

You went to great lengths to show me how messy it would be to interpret the justly divorced woman into this context. I don't understand why you would show me this since I had already answered that I apply it to the unjustly divorced woman. You have given me no reason to reject the more obvious reference.

The following is also a major reason to consider, but like many questions I have asked, you appear to not care to answer:

Under your ‘divorce for adultery’ model there exits a just and unjust divorce. The ‘just’ divorce is for the wife's adultery, the unjust divorce is for, let's say, burning dinner.
The way Matthew says it in 19:9 indicates that the last clause means exactly what it plainly says even after the man who unjustly divorces his wife marries another.
What would indicate that that last clause cannot mean what it very plainly says even after the man who divorced his wife unjustly has 'married another'? Even after he marries another, that last clause still has to mean what it says as it pertains to the unjustly divorced woman; in effect, whoever marries her who was divorced for burning dinner commits adultery.

Matthew 19:
9And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery.

I can respond to your other 4 topics when I get time.